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ABSTRACT
TWO ESSAYS ON INVESTOR ATTENTION AND ASSET PRICING
Nadia Asmaa Nafar 
Old Dominion University, 2015 
Director: Dr. Kenneth Yung
This dissertation explores the effect of investor attention, as measured by Google 
Search Volume Index, on security prices. It seeks to answer the following research 
questions: 1) what is the effect of investor attention on the expected returns of EREITs? 
And 2) what is the impact of investor attention on the open market repurchases post 
announcement returns?
Classic theory suggests that information is immediately incorporated into stock 
prices. However, existing empirical evidence shows that investors are limited in terms of 
the amount of information they can process. Kahneman (1973) advances that attention is 
a scarce cognitive resource. Individuals suffer from bounded rationality. When faced with 
large amounts of information, they are limited in terms of how much they can process. 
This implies that prices may not reflect all available information due to limited investor 
attention.
Essay 1 investigates the effect of investor attention on the expected returns of 
EREITs. The attention hypothesis of Barber and Odean (2008) suggests that increased 
attention leads to increased buying, which pushes prices and returns higher temporarily, 
but is followed by a reversal. We test the attention hypothesis on EREITs from 2004 to 
2012 using Search Volume Index (SVI) data in Google Trends. We find that EREITs 
that generate high investor attention, as measured by SVI, earn higher returns compared 
to EREITs that generate no investor attention. The results are driven by small stocks and 
stocks with high book to market ratio. We report that the SVI effect is not due to 
impediments to trade and conjecture that SVI increases investor recognition among 
EREITs that are characterized by information incompleteness, leading to higher returns. 
Over time, this increase in returns is followed by a reversal.
Essay 2 uses the attention hypothesis to generate insights into stock repurchases 
price drift. Using a sample of 318 firms that made repurchase announcements between 
2004 and 2008 and which have weekly search volume data in Google Trends, we find 
that investor attention has an effect on the repurchase drift for stocks during the first year 
following the announcement. More specifically, high abnormal search volume leads to a 
positive effect on cumulative returns during the first year following the announcement for 
small stocks, stocks with high idiosyncratic risk, low market to book ratio, and low past
return. Prior research has shown that for such stocks, the repurchase drift lasts for three 
years due to limits to arbitrage. As these stocks are dominated by retail investors, an 
increase in retail investors’ attention results in increased buying, which pushes prices and 
cumulative returns higher. Low abnormal search volume signals a decrease in investor 
attention and results in negative returns among all stocks. The results provide further 
support to the attention hypothesis.
Both essays find evidence that the level of investor attention has an effect on 
security prices. This is contrary to the predictions of the classical theory that postulates 
that information is immediately incorporated into stock prices.
This thesis is dedicated to my family
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my dissertation chair, Dr. Kenneth 
Yung, for his excellent guidance, timely feedback, patience, and encouragement 
throughout this process. I would also like to thank Dr. Mohammad Najand and Dr. 
Douglas Ziegenfuss for their valuable feedback, tremendous encouragement, and 
continuous support. Special thanks to Dr. Qian Sun for providing some of the data needed 
for this study.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES................................................................................................................vii
INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................................1
INVESTOR ATTENTION AND THE EXPECTED RETURNS OF E R E IT S  4
ABSTRACT......................................................................................................................... 4
INTRODUCTION...............................................................................................................4
LITERATURE REVIEW .................................................................................................. 7
SAMPLE AND DATA....................................................................................................... 10
RESULTS............................................................................................................................ 12
Descriptive statistics......................................................................................................... 12
Comparative Statistics......................................................................................................14
SVI and other investor attention measures..................................................................... 15
SVI and the cross section of EREITs returns................................................................. 17
SVI and returns in different time horizons..................................................................... 26
SVI and excess returns.................................................................................................... 31
SUMMARY.........................................................................................................................37
REFERENCES.................................................................................................................. 38
INVESTOR ATTENTION AND THE OPEN MARKET REPURCHASES POST
ANNOUNCEMENT RETURNS........................................................................................42
ABSTRACT....................................................................................................................... 42
INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................................42
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT............................................................................. 45
SAMPLE AND DATA.......................................................................................................50
RESULTS............................................................................................................................54
SUMMARY.........................................................................................................................63
REFERENCES.................................................................................................................. 64
CONCLUSION..................................................................................................................... 70
VITA........................................................................................................................................ 72
LIST OF TABLES
Table Title Page
I V ariables Definition.................................................................................................. 11
II Descriptive Statistics................................................................................................. 13
III SVI and EREIT characteristics.................................................................................15
IV-A Correlation between SVI and other investor attention measures...........................16
IV-B SVI and alternative measures of attention............................................................... 17
V Search Volume Index and EREITS Returns: Univariate Comparisons.................19
VI SVI-Related Trading Profits by Firm Characteristics, Illiquidity and
Investor Recognition measures.................................................................................22
VII SVI and returns over time.........................................................................................28
VIII The effect of SVI and other investor attention measures on returns..................... 33
IX-A The effect of SVI by analyst coverage.....................................................................34
IX-B The effect of SVI by analyst coverage, controlling for investor recognition 35
X-A Variables Definition.................................................................................................. 52
X-B Descriptive Statistics................................................................................................. 53
XI Abnormal Search Volume Index and Cumulative Returns: Univariate
Comparisons.............................................................................................................. 58
XII ASVI and Returns following Repurchase Announcements................................... 60
XIII The effect of ASVI on Cumulative Returns during the first year following the
repurchase announcement......................................................................................... 62
1INTRODUCTION
According to the efficient market hypothesis, stock prices reflect all available 
information (Fama 1970). However, the existing empirical evidence has documented 
several instances where this hypothesis was violated. Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and 
Vermaelen (1995) document stock price under-reaction following open market 
repurchase announcements. Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) find evidence of under­
reaction to earnings announcements as well as momentum effects. Michaely, Thaler and 
Womack (1995) document evidence of drift following dividend initiations and omissions. 
Similarly, Ikenberry, Rankine and Stice (1996) find evidence of drift following stock 
splits.
Kahneman (1973) suggests that attention is a scarce cognitive resource. 
Individuals have bounded rationality. When faced with large amounts of information, 
they are limited in terms of how much they can process. Consequently, they must be 
selective about the type of information to which they can dedicate their attention. This 
implies that limited investor attention may be the driver behind the slow incorporation of 
information into stock prices.
Several studies have examined the effect of investor attention on asset pricing.
For example, Engelberg, Sasseville, and Williams (2012) find that stocks that Jim Cramer 
mentions in his popular CNBC TV show Mad Money earn significantly positive 
overnight returns. Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2011) report that, in the case of IPOs, 
increased attention results in high abnormal returns in the first two weeks and the effect is 
reversed in one year. Tetlock (2011) reports that stale news result in temporary price 
movements among stocks dominated by individual investors. DellaVigna and Pollet 
(2009) find that investor inattention is high on Fridays. Earnings announcements made 
on Fridays have a 15% lower immediate response and a 70% higher delayed response. 
Hirshleifer, Lim and Teoh (2009) document that investor inattention increases on days 
crowded with earnings announcements. As a result, the immediate price response to 
earnings surprises is weaker and the post-earnings announcement drift is stronger. Fang 
and Peress (2009) suggest that investors’ limited attention is behind the finding that 
stocks highly covered by mass media have lower returns than stocks not covered by the
2media, controlling for other risk factors. Barber and Odean (2008) postulate that 
individuals are net-buyers of attention grabbing stocks. Individuals only buy the stocks 
that catch their attention, which has repercussions on security pricing.
This thesis investigates the role that investor attention plays in explaining the 
pricing of EREITs and the open market repurchases post announcement price drift. Essay 
1 examines the impact of investor attention on the expected returns of EREITs. It is 
important to consider this research question for several reasons. Recent studies report 
evidence suggesting that investor attention has an effect on common stocks. REITs are 
considered to be a “distinct asset” class. As a result, existing research examining the 
effect of investor attention on stock returns excludes REITs from their sample (Barber 
and Odean (2008), Hou, Peng, and Xiong (2009), Chemmanur and Yan (2009), and Da et 
al (2011)). We contribute to the literature by examining the effect of investor attention 
on EREITs returns. We focus on EREITs as they comprise the majority of REITs 
publicly traded. In addition, we use a novel and direct proxy of retail investor attention, 
which is G oogle’s Search Volume Index (SVI). SVI is considered an appropriate measure 
of retail investor attention. Given that EREITs behave like small stocks and are 
characterized by information opaqueness (Damodaran and Liu (1993), Danielsen and 
Harrison (2000) and Devos, Ong, and Spieler (2007)), they are more likely to attract 
retail investors (Barber and Odean (2008)). EREITs’ limited information dissemination 
and lack of transparency provide an appropriate setting to directly test the effect of 
investor attention on returns.
Essay 2 explores the impact of investor attention on the open market repurchases 
post announcement returns. Addressing this research question is important for several 
reasons. First, post repurchase price drift has not been studied from the perspective of 
investor attention. Most studies examine the link between under-reaction and the 
attention hypothesis in the context of earnings (Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003), Hirshleifer, 
Hou, Teoh, and Zhang (2004), Hou and Moskowitz (2005), Cohen and Frazzini (2008), 
Hou, Peng, and Xiong (2008), Hirshleifer et al 2009, and DellaVigna and Pollet (2009)). 
The impact of attention on returns following stocks buybacks is lacking. Second, under­
reaction is stronger among firms characterized by high idiosyncratic risk (Ikenberry et al 
(1995)). Such mispricing persists due to limits to arbitrage that result from high
3idiosyncratic risk (Pontiff (2006), Shleifer and Vishny 1997, Gromb and Vayanos (2002), 
Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002), Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003), and Doukas, Kim, and 
Pantzalis (2010)). This paper seeks to identify the impact that investor attention has on 
the post repurchase price drift given different levels of limits to arbitrage and 
idiosyncratic risk. Finally, this paper adds to the existing literature by using a novel and 
direct proxy of individual investor attention; Google’s SVI (Da et al 2011).
Both essays use SVI to proxy for investor attention. SVI represents a term’s total 
number of searches scaled by its time-series average and is produced weekly using 
Google’s aggregate search frequency. Given that search is a measure of attention and 
that Google is a commonly used search engine, its reported search logs are likely to be 
representative of that of the entire population and, as a result, appropriate in measuring 
investor attention (Da et al 2011). SVI is also considered a proxy that is specific to retail 
investors because they are likely to use the internet to obtain financial information (Da et 
al 2011). More sophisticated institutional investors use information services such as 
Reuters and Bloomberg terminals. SVI is obtained using each com pany’s ticker symbol 
(Da et al 2011). This allows accounting for search logs made for financial and 
investment purposes. In addition, all SVI reports are obtained from the Finance Category 
in Google Trends to reduce noise.
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INVESTOR ATTENTION AND THE EXPECTED RETURNS OF EREITS 
ABSTRACT
This study investigates the effect of investor attention on the expected returns of 
EREITs. The attention hypothesis of Barber and Odean (2008) suggests that increased 
attention leads to increased buying, which pushes prices and returns higher temporarily, 
but is followed by a reversal. We test the attention hypothesis on EREITs from 2004 to 
2012 using Search Volume Index (SVI) data in Google Trends. We find that EREITs 
that generate high investor attention, as measured by SVI, earn higher returns compared 
to EREITs that generate no investor attention. The results are driven by small stocks and 
stocks with high book to market ratio. We report that the SVI effect is not due to 
impediments to trade and conjecture that SVI increases investor recognition among 
EREITs that are characterized by information incompleteness, leading to higher returns. 
Over time, this increase in returns is followed by a reversal.
INTRODUCTION
Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) are investment tools used to facilitate 
investor participation in the real estate market; as directly investing in this market can be 
costly in terms of resources and information. REITs are closed- end investment 
companies that are traded like stocks. These stocks have gained increased popularity in 
the last two decades as they are used as tools for diversification (Goetzmann and 
Ibbotson, 1990), are liquid (Han and Liang 1995), and constitute an economic way to 
purchase real estate due to the reduction in transaction and information costs they provide 
(Ghosh, Miles and Sirmans (1996)).
According to the National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts’ 
(NAREIT) website1, there were 202 USA publicly traded REITs with a market
1 http://www.reit.com /nareit
5capitalization of over $670 billion at the end of 2013. Two major categories comprise the 
REITs market. These are Equity REITs (EREITs) and Mortgage REITs (MREITs). 
EREITs are real estate investment companies that generate their income from rent. 
MREITs are real estate investment companies that generate their revenue from interest 
earned from mortgage loans and mortgage-backed securities. EREITs constitute the 
majority of these publicly traded REITS with a total of 161 publicly traded stocks and a 
total market capitalization of over $608 billion as of the end of 2013.
Classic theory suggests that information is immediately incorporated into stock 
prices. However, existing empirical evidence shows that investors are limited in terms of 
the amount of information they can process. Kahneman (1973) reports that attention is a 
scarce cognitive resource. Prices, therefore, may not reflect all available information due 
to limited investor attention.
Recent studies report evidence suggesting that investor attention has an effect on 
common stocks. REITs are considered to be a “distinct asset” class. As a result, existing 
research examining the effect of investor attention on stock returns excludes REITs from 
their sample (Barber and Odean (2008), Hou, Peng, and Xiong (2009), Chemmanur and 
Yan (2009), Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2011)). We contribute to the literature by 
examining the effect of investor attention on EREITs returns. We focus on EREITs as 
they comprise the majority of REITs publicly traded. In addition, we use a novel and 
direct proxy of retail investor attention, which is Google’s Search Volume Index (SVI). 
SVI is considered an appropriate measure of retail investor attention. Given that EREITs 
behave like small stocks and are characterized by information opaqueness (Damodaran 
and Liu (1993), Danielsen and Harrison (2000) and Devos, Ong, and Spieler (2007)), 
they are more likely to attract retail investors (Barber and Odean (2008)). EREITs’ 
limited information dissemination and lack of transparency provide an appropriate setting 
to directly test the effect of investor attention on returns.
We find that SVI is a unique measure of investor attention among EREITs and 
does not merely reflect other investor attention measures, such as trading volume, analyst 
coverage, or excess returns. We also find that EREITs that attract high investor attention, 
as measured by SVI, generate higher returns than EREITs with no investor attention. The 
univariate analysis shows that average returns are especially higher for the EREITs that
6are small, with high book to market ratio, low past month return, low price, and are 
highly illiquid.
The SVI effect is explained by the Attention hypothesis of Barber and Odean 
(2008). The hypothesis posits that individual investors are net-buyers of “attention- 
grabbing” stocks. Prior to buying, investors consider a set of stocks they research and to 
which they devote attention. When buying, they choose from this set of stocks. However, 
when selling, they can only sell what they already own. The attention hypothesis 
proposes that increased attention leads to increased buying, which temporarily pushes 
prices higher and results in higher returns. Over the long-term, this price pressure is 
reversed. Da et al (2011) reports that in the case of IPOs, increased attention results in 
high abnormal returns in the first two weeks and the effect is reversed in one year.
Controlling for risk factors using the CAPM, the Fama-French (1993) three-factor 
model, and the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, we find that increased investor attention 
results in higher average returns among stocks that are small and with high book to 
market ratio. To ensure that the SVI effect is not spurious, we investigate whether 
impediments to trade are behind the effect. The impediments-to-trade hypothesis 
suggests that limits to arbitrage, due to severe market frictions, cause mispricing to 
persist. As a result, the SVI effect may be due to illiquidity and lack of professional 
investors’ involvement. Our findings suggest that the SVI effect is not explained by 
impediments to trade. Using illiquidity proxies, such as Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity 
ratio, the dollar trading volume, and price, we find insignificant profits among highly 
illiquid stocks. We conclude that although the SVI effect is strong among small stocks, 
we find no support that the effect is due to impediments to trade.
Rather, the SVI effect is due to improvement in investor recognition. Merton’s 
(1987) investor recognition hypothesis suggests that in markets with incomplete 
information, investors are not aware of all securities. As a result, a stock that has low 
investor recognition needs to offer higher returns to compensate its holders for being 
imperfectly diversified. Lehavy and Sloan (2008) explain that investor recognition 
increases returns over the short term, but decreases expected returns over the long run.
We find that SVI improves investor recognition among stocks with no analyst coverage
7and poor information dissemination and results in higher returns. Over time, however, 
the positive effect of SVI on returns is reversed.
Finally, controlling for alternative measures of attention, we find that SVI has a 
positive and significant effect on excess returns. Splitting the sample between EREITs 
with no analyst coverage and those with analyst coverage, we find that the effect is driven 
by stocks with no analyst coverage. We conclude that SVI improves investor recognition 
among stocks that suffer from poor information dissemination and high information 
incompleteness, which results in high excess returns. This lends support to the Attention 
hypothesis of Barber and Odean (2008) and Merton’s (1987) investor recognition 
hypothesis. The results also support the assertion that EREITs behave similarly to 
common stocks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I presents the 
literature review. Sample description and data are described in Section II. Section III 
summarizes the findings. The final section concludes the paper.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Our paper relates to two strands of literature. It contributes to the strand of 
literature that examines the effect of investor attention on stock returns and to the 
literature that investigates the determinants of REITs returns.
According to the efficient market hypothesis, stock prices reflect all available 
information (Fama 1970). This hypothesis, however, is challenged by the argument that 
investors have limited attention. Kahneman (1973) suggests that attention is a scarce 
cognitive resource. Individuals have bounded rationality. When faced with large 
amounts of information, they are limited in terms of how much they can process. 
Consequently, they must be selective about the type of information to which they can 
dedicate their attention.
Several studies have examined the effect of investor attention on asset pricing. 
Engelberg, Sasseville, and Williams (2012) find that stocks that Jim Cramer mentions in 
his popular CNBC TV show Mad Money earn significantly positive overnight returns.
Da et al (2011) report that, in the case of IPOs, increased attention results in high
8abnormal returns in the first two weeks and the effect is reversed in one year. Tetlock 
(2011) reports that stale news result in temporary price movements among stocks 
dominated by individual investors. DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) find that investor 
inattention is high on Fridays. Earnings announcements made on Fridays have a 15% 
lower immediate response and a 70% higher delayed response. Hirshleifer, Lim and 
Teoh (2009) document that investor inattention increases on days crowded with earnings 
announcements. As a result, the immediate price response to earnings surprises is weaker 
and the post-earnings announcement drift is stronger. Fang and Peress (2009) suggest 
that investors’ limited attention is behind the finding that stocks highly covered by mass 
media have lower returns than stocks not covered by the media, controlling for other risk 
factors. Barber and Odean (2008) postulate that individuals are net-buyers of attention 
grabbing stocks. Individuals only buy the stocks that catch their attention, which has 
repercussions on security pricing. Hou, Peng, and Xiong (2008) provide evidence that 
price under-reaction to earnings news weakens with increased investor attention while 
over-reaction strengthens with increased investor attention. Cohen and Frazzini (2008) 
find that there is return predictability among firms that are economically linked, which 
suggests that investor inattention exists. Hou and Moskowitz (2005) report that limited 
investor recognition is associated with the delay in the incorporation of information into 
stock prices. Hirshleifer, Hou, Teoh, and Zhang (2004) find evidence that investors’ high 
attention to accounting profitability compared to cash profitability results in the former 
predicting long-term returns. Huberman and Regev (2001) report the case of a 
pharmaceutical firm called EntreMed whose price soared following the publication of the 
news story that the company is potentially developing cancer cure drugs in the New York 
Times. The news, however, was stale as it was already published in the journal Nature 
and other media outlets five month earlier but received no attention.
We contribute to the literature on investor attention by using a novel and direct 
proxy of individual investor attention. We use Google’s Search Volume Index (SVI) 
obtained from Google Trends (http://www.google.com/trendsl. SVI represents a term’s 
total number of searches scaled by its time-series average and is produced weekly using 
Google’s aggregate search frequency. It is a direct measure of attention because 
investors only search those stocks that they pay attention to. SVI is considered an
9investor measure specific to retail investors. Institutional investors do not use Google to 
get information. Instead, they have access to more sophisticated information services, 
such as Reuters and Bloomberg terminals and are not as limited in terms of attention as 
they devote significant amount of time and energy to research stocks.
Prior studies have used different proxies to measure investor attention. They 
include trading volume (Gervais, Kaniel, and Mingelgrin (2001), Barber and Odean 
(2008), and Hou, Peng, and Xiong (2008)), advertising expenditures (Chemmanur and 
Yan (2009)), Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston (2004), and Lou (2014)), prior excess returns 
(Barber and Odean (2008), price limits (Seasholes and Wu (2007), and news media 
coverage ((Barber and Odean (2008), Yuan (2008), and Fang and Peress (2009)). Da et al 
(2011) propose that such proxies are indirect measures of investor attention. They argue 
that these measures involve the assumption that appearance in the media, an increase in 
trading volume, or high excess returns are automatically linked to investor attention. 
However, an increase in trading volume or high returns may be due to other factors 
besides investor attention. Huberman and Regev (2001) assert that though a firm may 
appear in the media, increased investor attention is not guaranteed. Cohen and Frazzini 
(2008) report that investors are often overwhelmed by the amount o f  information reported 
in the media and they cannot effectively process it.
This paper is also related to the literature that investigates the determinants of 
REITs returns. One strand of this literature uses market factors and firm characteristics 
to explain the returns of REITs. Findings suggest that REITs behave like small 
capitalization stocks (Chan, Hendershott, and Sanders (1990), Han and Liang (1995) and 
Peterson and Hsieh (1997)), that they behave similarly to a portfolio composed of stocks 
and bonds (Sanders (1998)), and that they are more affected by the maturity rate spread 
between short and long term treasuries than by the credit rate spread between commercial 
bonds and treasuries (Swanson, Theis and Casey (2002)). Chui, Titman and Wei (2003) 
propose that the 1990s marked an increase in the effect of market momentum on REITs 
returns. REITs are also found to be sensitive to firm size and market to book ratio 
(Sanders (1998) and Chen, Hsieh, Vines, and Chiou (1998)). Sun and Yung (2009) find 
that idiosyncratic risk is positively related to EREITs returns.
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The other strand of literature uses behavioral models to explain REITs returns. 
Lin, Rahman, and Yung (2009) examine the effect of investor sentiment on REIT returns. 
They find that when investors are optimistic (pessimistic), REIT returns get higher 
(lower). Pyles (2009) document that Seasonal Affective Disorder (SAD), commonly 
known as “winter blues” has an effect on the returns of REITs. In the fall months when 
the amount of daylight declines, SAD results in low returns as SAD inflicted investors 
sell their risky holdings, which result in lower returns. Returns climb higher in winter 
months as the amount of daylight increases. The results are driven by the smallest forty 
percent o f REITs in the sample. Lin, Rahman, and Yung (2010) report that realized 
returns lead trading volume, which suggests that investor overconfidence has an effect on 
REITs returns.
Our paper is closely related to Sun, Yung, and Rahman (2010) who investigate 
the effect of investor recognition on EREIT returns. Using Merton’s (1987) model of 
investor recognition, they argue that EREITs returns are positively related to shadow 
cost. Shadow cost refers to the additional returns required by investors to hold stocks for 
which there is incomplete information. A zero cost trading strategy that longs high 
shadow cost EREIT stocks and shorts low shadow cost EREIT stocks is associated with 
significant positive returns. Our results reveal that investor attention, as measured by 
SVI, has a significant positive effect on returns even after controlling for shadow cost. 
This is especially true among stocks with no analyst coverage.
SAMPLE AND DATA
Our sample consists of EREIT firms listed in the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) between 2004 and 2012. The analysis starts in 2004 because it is the first 
year for which SVI data is available. Our main explanatory variable, SVI, is obtained 
through Google Trends at ('http://www.google.com/trends). SVI constitutes a term’s total 
number of searches scaled by its time-series average and is produced weekly using 
Google’s aggregate search frequency. It is considered an appropriate measure of investor 
attention as search is a measure of attention and is representative of the entire population 
due to the fact that Google is a commonly and frequently used search engine (Da et al 
(2011)). SVI is obtained using each company’s ticker symbol (Da et al 2011). This
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allows accounting for search logs made for financial and investment purposes. In 
addition, all SVI reports are obtained from the Finance Category in Google Trends to 
reduce noise.
Return, market capitalization, and trading volume data are obtained from CRSP. 
Accounting data is obtained from Compustat. Analyst coverage data is collected from the 
I/B/E/S summary files and Institutional ownership is obtained from the 13f filings. The 
final sample comprises 182 EREITs firms with complete data. Table I reports all 
variables used in the study along with their definitions.
Table I 
Variables Definition
Variable Definition
SVI Monthly Google's search volume index
Size The natural logarithm of the previous calendar year’s average 
market capitalization in thousands of dollars
Book-to-Market 
or Log(mtb)
The natural logarithm of the book value of equity divided by the 
market value of equity, as of the previous year end
Past Month 
Return
Previous month's stock return
Beta A stock’s systematic risk
Share Price or 
Price
Previous month's stock price
Illiquidity or
niqd
Amihud illiquidity ratio and is daily absolute stock return to daily 
dollar trading volume, scaled by 10-s
Dollar trading 
volume
daily closing price times daily trading volume, averaged over days 
in a year
Daily absolute 
stock return
absolute value of the stock's daily closing price
Mkt-rf Monthly excess return on the market
SMB Monthly performance of small stocks relative to big stocks
HML Monthly performance of value stocks relative to growth stocks
UMD Monthly performance of high past 12 month return stocks relative 
to low past 12 month return stocks
12 month 
momentum
return on company’s stock over the past 12 months
Instown monthly fraction of the number of shares owned by institutional 
investors to the number of common shares outstanding
12
idiosyncratic 
volatility or 
Idiovol
monthly volatility of stock's return unexplained by fama french's 
three factor model
Log(size) Logarithm of total assets
Analyst coverage 
or ANUM
logarithm of 1 plus the yearly number of analysts following a 
stock
Fraction of
Individual
Ownership
1- the monthly fraction of the number of shares owned by 
institutional investors to the number of common shares 
outstanding
Idiosyncratic 
Volatility per 
Investor
the ratio of idiosyncratic volatility to the number of shareholders
logmarketcap Logarithm of monthly market capitalization
logtumover Logarithm of monthly trading volume
absabnretum Absolute value of monthly equally weighted excess return
Monthly analyst 
coverage
logarithm of 1 plus the monthly number of analysts following a 
stock
Advtosales Ratio of advertising expense to sales in the previous fiscal year. If 
missing on Compustat, advertising expense is set to 0
Shadow cost Shadow cost of incomplete information. It equals 2.5 * idiovol * 
X t * (  1-M)/M
Xt the capitalization of the firm divided by total EREITS market cap
M the ratio of the number of shareholders to the total number of 
investors in the market
logyTvol Logarithm of yearly trading volume
RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics
Table II displays the mean, median, and standard deviation of the main variables 
used in the study. SVI is the monthly Google's search volume index number. SVI’s mean 
value among EREITs used in the sample is 40.70 with a standard deviation of 76.63.
Size is the natural logarithm of the previous calendar year’s average market capitalization 
in thousands of dollars. The mean size of companies in the sample is 13.65 and the 
standard deviation is 1.67. The book to market ratio is measured as the natural logarithm 
of the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity, as of the previous year 
end. The average value of the book to market ratio is -0.59 with a standard deviation of 
0.76. The mean past month return of EREIT firms in the sample is 0.8% and the standard
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deviation is 11%. Share price depicts the previous month's stock price. The average 
monthly share price for the EREITs in the sample is 29.21 with a median value of 20.26 
and a standard deviation of 36.46. Illiquidity is measured using the Amihud illiquidity 
ratio, which is the daily absolute stock return to daily dollar trading volume, scaled 
by 10-5 . The average value of the illiquidity measure is 11.32, a median of 0.02, and a 
standard deviation of 359.75. Momentum is the return on company’s stock over the past 
12 months. The mean value is 0.11 with a standard deviation of 0.37. The average 
number of analysts following an EREIT is 1.67 with a standard deviation of 0.59. 
Institutional ownership is the fraction of the number of shares owned by institutional 
investors to the number of common shares outstanding. The mean of institutional 
ownership is 74% with a standard deviation of 47%. Idiosyncratic volatility is the 
monthly volatility of stock's return unexplained by Fama French's three factor model. 
The mean idiosyncratic volatility is 2% with a standard deviation of 48%. Advtosales is 
the ratio of advertising expense to sales in the previous fiscal year. If missing on 
Compustat, advertising expense is set to 0. The mean value is 0.7% with a standard 
deviation of 3%.
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Table II 
Descriptive Statistics
This table displays the mean, median, and standard deviation of the main variables used in the 
study. The sample consists of 182 firms EREIT firms from 2004 to 2012. SVI is the monthly 
Google's search volume index number. Size is the natural logarithm of the previous calendar 
year’s average market capitalization in thousands of dollars. BM is the book to market ratio is 
measured as the natural logarithm of the book value of equity divided by the market value of 
equity, as of the previous year end. The past month return is the previous month's stock return. 
Share price is the previous month's stock price. ILLIQ*10-5 is measured using the Amihud 
illiquidity ratio, which is the daily absolute stock return to daily dollar trading volume, scaled 
bylO-5 . Momentum is the return on company’s stock over the past 12 months. ANUM is 
logarithm of 1 plus the yearly number of analysts following a stock. Instown is the fraction of the 
number of shares owned by institutional investors to the number of common shares outstanding. 
Idiovol is the monthly volatility of stock's return unexplained by fama french's three factor model. 
Advtosales is the ratio of advertising expense to sales in the previous fiscal year. If missing on 
Compustat, advertising expense is set to 0.
Variable Mean Median Std Dev
SVI 40.70 0 76.63
size 13.65 13.88 1.67
BM -0.59 -0.55 0.76
Past month return 0.008 0.01 0.11
Share price 29.21 20.26 36.46
ILLIQ*10~5 11.32 0.02 359.75
Momentum 0.11 0.13 0.37
ANUM 1.67 1.79 0.59
instown 0.74 0.79 0.47
idiovol 0.02 0.01 0.48
Advtosales 0.007 0 0.03
Comparative Statistics
In Table III, we identify no SVI and high SVI stocks and compare their firm 
characteristics. The mean (median) level of size for high SVI stocks is 13.78 (13.97) 
compared to 13.36 (13.55) for no SVI stocks. High SVI stocks are significantly larger 
than no SVI stocks. Using book to market ratio, we find that the mean (median) levels 
are -0.49 (-0.53) for high SVI stocks compared to -0.55 (-0.52) for stocks with no SVI. 
The mean difference shows that high SVI stocks have significantly higher of book to 
market ratio. The median difference, however, shows that high SVI stocks have 
significantly lower book to market than no SVI stocks. The mean (median) level of share
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price is 27.43 (20.02) for high SVI stocks compared to 31.75 (17.00) for no SVI stocks. 
The mean difference of share price is significantly lower for high SVI stocks relative to 
no SVI stocks. The median difference of share price, however, is significantly higher for 
high SVI stocks relative to no SVI stocks. As for illiquidity, the mean (median) of high 
SVI stocks is 22.67 (0.019) relative to 6.18 (0.0038) for no SVI stocks. The mean 
difference shows that high SVI stocks are highly and more significantly illiquid than no 
SVI stocks. The median difference, however, shows that high SVI stocks are less illiquid. 
The mean (median) of analyst coverage for high SVI stocks is 1.78 (1.79) compared to 
1.53(1.60) for no SVI stocks. High SVI stocks have significantly more analyst coverage 
than no SVI stocks. We can conclude that high SVI stocks tend to be larger and generate 
more analysts following relative to no SVI stocks.
Table III 
SVI and EREIT characteristics
Table III reports the mean and median of different EREITs characteristics for no SVI and high 
SVI stocks and the difference between them. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level, respectively.
No SVI High SVI Difference in 
mean (p-value)
Difference in 
median (p- 
value)
Size 13.36(13.55) 13.78(13.97)
0.41 ***(<-0001)
-0.42***
(<.0001)
Book-market -0.55 (-0.52) -0.49 (-0.53) -0.06 *** 
(<.0001)
0.01***
(<.0001)
Share price 31.75 (17.00) 27.43 (20.02) 4.31*** (<.0001) -3.02***
(<.0001)
Illiquidity*10-5 6.18(0.038) 22.67 (0.019) -16.49***
(<.0001)
0.019***
(<.0001)
Analyst coverage 1.53 (1.60) 1.78(1.79) -0.24***
(<.0001)
-0.19***
(<.0001)
SVI and other investor attention measures
In this section, we examine whether SVI is related to other investor attention 
measures and whether it provides explanatory power to EREITs beyond that provided by 
these alternative measures. Table IV-A displays the correlation between SVI and other
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investor attention measures. The table shows that, in general, log (SVI) has a relatively 
low correlation with other investor measures. The correlation between log (SVI) and 
logmarketcap, logtumover, absabnretum, analystcoverage, and advtosales are 4.856%, 
14.708%, 2.352%, 11.094%, and -6.111% respectively. Although the correlations 
between log (SVI) and logmarketcap, logtumover, analystcoverage, and advtosales are 
significant, all correlations remain low.
In Table IV-B, we regress monthly log (SVI) on alternative monthly measures of 
investor attention. Logmarketcap is negatively and significantly related to log(SVI) in 
columns (1), (2), and (3). This suggests that stocks that generate high SVI tend to be 
small stocks. Logtumover is positively and significantly related to log (SVI) in columns 
(1), (2), and (3), which means that an increase in trading volume increases investor 
attention. Absabnretum and Advtosavles are significantly negatively related to log (SVI) 
in all columns while log (SVI) and analyst coverage is positively related.
The R2 for the regression reported in column (1) is 3.08% and 2.01% for columns (2) and 
(3). The values of R2 in all regressions are very small, which means that alternative 
measures of attention explain a small fraction of the variation in SVI. This is similar to 
the findings of Da et al (2011). SVI, therefore, is a unique investor attention measure 
among EREITs.
Table IV-A
Correlation between SVI and other investor attention measures
logSVI logmarketcap logtumover absabnretum analystcoverage Advtosales
logSVI 1 0.048569*** 0.14708*** 0.02352*** 0.11094*** -0.06111***
<.0001 <.0001 0.0088 <.0001 <.0001
12406 12406 12405 12406 5776 10776
logmarketcap 0.04856*** 1 0.76130*** -0.20991*** 0.26871*** 0.08641***
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
12406 13439 13435 13366 6039 10852
logtumover 0.14708*** 0.76130*** 1 0.05292*** 0.36141*** 0.05621***
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
12405 13435 13501 13362 6046 10851
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absabnretum 0.02352*** -0.20991*** 0.05292*** 1 0.01759 -0.03267***
0.0088 <.0001 <.0001 0.1718 0.0007
12406 13366 13362 13366 6038 10809
analystcoverage 0.11094*** 0.26871*** 0.36141*** 0.01759 1 -0.03768***
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.1718 0.0062
5776 6039 6046 6038 6051 5266
Advtosales -0.06111*** 0.08641*** 0.05621*** -0.03267*** -0.03768*** 1
<.0001 <.0001 <0001 0.0007 0.0062
10776 10852 10851 10809 5266 10906
Table IV-B
SVI and alternative measures of attention
The dependent variable is the monthly log(SVI). Independent variables are defined in Table I. P- 
values are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. The sample period is from January 2004 to December 2012.
(1) (2) (3)
Intercept 1.07626*** 0.91094** 1.29983***
(<.0001) (0.0127) (0.0010)
logmarketcap -0.20990*** -0.14082*** -0.12578***
(<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0002)
logtumover 0.30252*** 0.21402*** 0.17291***
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
absabnretum -0.61900** -1.47058*** -1.25422***
(0.0114) (0.0005) (0.0073)
Monthly analystcoverage 0.40042*** 0.36778***
(<.0001) (<.0001)
Advtosales -4.27303***
(<.0001)
Observations 12405 5776 5256
R2 0.0308 0.0201 0.0201
SVI and the cross section of EREITs returns
We investigate the impact of SVI on the cross section of EREITs returns. We 
first conduct a univariate analysis examining average returns and then conduct a
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multivariate analysis by forming subsamples of firms sorted by firm characteristics, 
illiquidity, and investor recognition and controlling for various risk factors.
Univariate Analysis
Table V reports the average monthly returns of stocks double sorted by SVI and 
firm characteristics. Each month, stocks are sorted into terciles by size, BM, past month 
return, price, and illiquidity. Terciles 1 and 3 refer to the lowest and highest value of 
each characteristic, respectively. Stocks in each characteristic-based tercile are sorted 
into three SVI portfolios: no SVI, low SVI, and high SVI. Stocks with no SVI are first 
identified. The remaining stocks are divided into low and high SVI groups using the 
median value of SVI. The table displays the equal-weighed return of each portfolio 
during the following month.
Examining all stocks in the sample, the table shows that the average monthly 
return for stocks with no, low, and high SVI are 0.81%, 0.86% and 1.08%, respectively. 
The average return between no SVI and high SVI stocks is -0.26%, which is significant at 
the 1% level. The results show that, overall, stocks that generate high SVI earn higher 
returns.
Double sorting stocks by SVI and size in panel A, we find that small stocks that 
generate high SVI earn significantly higher returns than small stocks that generate no 
SVI. Panel B shows that high book to market stocks with high SVI earn significantly 
higher returns than high book to marker stocks with no SVI. Low book to market stocks 
with high SVI, however, earn significantly lower returns than low book to market stocks 
with no SVI. Panel C displays stocks double sorted by past month return and SVI. The 
panel shows that for stocks that earned low to medium past month returns, high SVI 
results in higher average returns than similar stocks with no SVI. Double sorting by price 
and SVI, panel D shows that low and medium priced stocks that generate high SVI earn 
significantly higher returns than similar no SVI stocks. Panel D reports that highly 
illiquid stocks with high SVI earn significantly higher returns than highly illiquid stocks 
with no SVI.
The table shows that stocks that generate high SVI earn higher returns compared 
to stocks with no SVI. Double sorting by SVI and firm characteristics, we find that the
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results are driven by stocks that are more mispriced. High SVI stocks that are small, with 
high book to market ratio, low past month return, low price, and are highly illiquid earn 
higher average returns than similar stocks with no SVI.
This provides support the Barber and Odean (2008) attention hypothesis. Retail 
investors are net-buyers of “attention-grabbing” EREIT stocks. As attention increases, 
buying increases. This results in higher price pressure and higher returns.
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Table V
Search Volume Index and EREITS Returns: Univariate Comparisons
This table presents average monthly returns for EREIT stocks with no, low, and high Google’s 
Search Volume Index (SVI). Each month, we sort stocks into terciles by size, BM, past month 
return, price, and illiquidity. Terciles 1 and 3 refer to the lowest and highest value of each 
characteristic, respectively. We sort each characteristic-based tercile into three SVI portfolios: no 
SVI, low SVI, and high SVI. Stocks with no SVI are first identified. The remaining stocks are 
divided into low and high SVI groups using the median value of SVI. We then compute the 
equal-weighed return of each portfolio during the following month. The results are reported and 
p-values are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively.
Average Monthly Return
SVI t- Statistics for P-value
for
No Low High No-High No-High No-High
All Stocks 0.81797 0.86019 1.08466 -0.267*** -3.85 (0.0001)
Panel A: By Size
1 -0.0585417 0.2903 0.9702 -1.03*** -7.02 (<.0001)
2 0.97916 0.94523 0.88608 0.0931 0.88 (0.3782)
3 1.53916 1.33946 1.3922 0.147 1.44 (0.1508)
Panel B: By Book-to-Market
1 1.32433 1.05041 0.46279 0.862*** 9.14 (<.0001)
2 0.57964 0.84489 0.54277 0.0369 0.36 (0.7188)
3 0.57406 0.61462 1.89715 -1.32*** -8.91 (<.0001)
Panel C: By Past Month Return
1 0.84345 1.19374 1.18825 -0.345** -2.49 (0.0127)
2 0.8498 0.81601 1.32888 -0.479*** -4.51 (<.0001)
3 0.74739 0.58069 0.71166 0.0357 0.31 (0.7563)
Panel D: By Price
1 0.69432 0.77523 1.30787 -0.614** -3.72 (0.0002)
2 0.75761 0.79793 1.00259 -0.245*** -2.58 (0.0098)
3 1.00009 1.00713 0.94387 0.0562 0.68 (0.4991)
Panel E: By Illiquidity
1 0.92479 0.8911 0.99242 -0.068 -0.68 (0.4960)
2 1.06935 0.85394 1.04899 0.0204 0.18 (0.8570)
3 0.50543 0.90733 1.21352 -0.708*** -4.91 (<.0001)
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Multivariate analysis
We next identify the subsamples where the SVI effect is strongest. Table VI, Part 
A, examines the profitability of an SVI-based trading strategy in subsamples of firms 
sorted by firm characteristics and controlling for risk factors. We use three different 
factor models: the CAPM, the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model, and the Carhart
(1997) four-factor model. Each month, we sort stocks into terciles by size, BM, price, 
and momentum. Terciles 1 and 3 refer to the lowest and highest value of each 
characteristic, respectively. Stocks are then sorted into three portfolios: no SVI, low SVI, 
and high SVI. Stocks with no SVI are first identified, and then the remaining stocks are 
divided into the low and high SVI groups using the median value of SVI. We create zero- 
cost portfolios that long high SVI stocks and short no SVI stocks in the following month. 
Portfolio weights are rebalanced monthly. Reported numbers are alphas from regressing 
the resulting time series of zero-investment portfolio returns on the CAPM, FF-3 and FF- 
4.
Table VI, Part A, shows that the SVI effect is strong among small stocks but has 
no effect on large stocks. We find significantly positive alphas among small stocks, 
stocks with high book to market ratio, and stocks with medium past momentum. These 
are stocks that are typically characterized by poor information dissemination and are 
highly mispriced. This begs the question as to whether the SVI effect results in higher 
returns due to reduction in mispricing or whether it is spurious and simply persists due to 
limits of arbitrage.
In Table VI, Part B and C, we seek to explain the SVI effect. We investigate the 
role of the “impediments-to-trade” hypothesis and the “investor recognition” hypothesis 
in explaining the investor attention effect.
The “Impediments-to-trade” hypothesis postulates that severe market frictions 
constitute “impediments-to-trade” that limit arbitrageurs’ involvement, which causes 
mispricing to persist. We examine whether impediments to trade are behind the SVI 
effect. If impediments to trade are behind the SVI effect, then abnormal returns should 
be prevalent among highly illiquid stocks. To proxy for illiquidity, we use the Amihud’s 
(2002) illiquidity ratio, dollar trading volume, and price. Table VI, Part B, reports the 
alphas related to a trading strategy that longs high SVI stocks and shorts no SVI stocks
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for subgroups sorted based on these illiquidity proxies. We find positive but insignificant 
alphas among highly illiquid stocks. This suggests that impediments to trade are not 
behind the SVI effect.
The investor recognition hypothesis advanced by Merton (1987) suggests that in 
markets with incomplete information, investors are not aware of all securities. As a result, 
a stock that has low investor recognition needs to offer higher returns to compensate its 
holders for the risk borne. Lehavy and Sloan (2008) find that increased investor 
recognition results in higher contemporaneous returns, but decreases expected returns 
over the long run. We conjecture that when investors pay attention to a stock, the level of 
investor recognition related to the stock increases, which increases returns. If SVI results 
in higher investor recognition, then the SVI effect should be stronger among stocks 
characterized by low investor recognition and high information incompleteness.
Two measures are used to proxy for the degree of information incompleteness. 
These are analyst coverage and the fraction of individual ownership. Stocks with poor 
analyst coverage and high fraction of individual ownership are stocks characterized by 
high information incompleteness and therefore have low investor recognition.
In Table VI, part C, Panels A and B, we report the alphas related to a trading 
strategy that longs high SVI stocks and shorts no SVI stocks for subgroups sorted based 
on investor recognition measures. We find that the SVI effect is particularly strong 
among stocks with no analyst coverage. These are stocks characterized by poor 
information dissemination. SVI, therefore, increases investor recognition among these 
stocks. This means that SVI plays an important role in increasing investor recognition.
Two other measures are used to proxy for the cost of poor investor recognition. 
Idiosyncratic volatility measures the risk that shareholders bear as a result of imperfect 
diversification. Institutional ownership is a proxy for short sale constraints (Chen, Hong, 
and Stein (2002)). In Table VI, part C, Panels C and D, we report the alphas related to a 
trading strategy that longs high SVI stocks and shorts no SVI stocks for subgroups sorted 
based on idiosyncratic volatility and institutional ownership. We find that the SVI effect 
has no significant effect on idiosyncratic volatility or short sale constraints.
Overall, table VI shows that the SVI effect is strong among stocks that are small 
and with poor information dissemination. The high returns witnessed among these stocks
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as a result of high SVI is due to improvement in investor recognition. As investor 
attention, as measured by SVI, increases, investor recognition of the stock increases, 
which results in higher returns.
Table VI
SVI-Related Trading Profits by Firm Characteristics, Illiquidity and Investor
Recognition measures
This table examines the profitability of an SVI-based trading strategy in subsamples of firms 
sorted by firm characteristics (Part A), illiquidity (Part B), and investor recognition (Part C). 
Each month, we sort stocks into terciles by size, BM, price, momentum, and different liquidity 
and investor attention measures. Terciles 1 and 3 refer to the lowest and highest value of each 
characteristic, respectively. Stocks are then sorted into three portfolios: no SVI, low SVI, and 
high SVI. Stocks with no SVI are first identified, and then the remaining stocks are divided into 
the low and high SVI groups using the median value of SVI. We create zero-cost portfolios that 
long high SVI stocks and short no SVI stocks in the following month. Portfolio weights are 
rebalanced monthly. Reported numbers are alphas from regressing the resulting time series of 
zero-investment portfolio returns on the CAPM, FF-3 and FF-4. P-values are in parentheses. *, 
**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Part A: By Firm Characteristics
CAPM FF Three-Factor Carhart Four- 
Factor
Panel A: By Firm Size
Small
0.0120** 0.0126** 0.0122**
(0.0499) (0.0365) (0.0409)
Medium
-0.000609 -0.000983 -0.001036
( 0.1440) (0.7873) (0.7772)
Large
-0.000567 -0.000314 -0.000383
( 0.8709) (0.9281) (0.9128)
Panel B: By Book-to-V arket
Low
-0.003870 -0.003632 -0.003833
(0.2016) (0.2284) (0.1995)
Medium
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0.002955 0.002882 0.002691
(0.4943) (0.5079) (0.5360)
High
0.0104* 0.0109* 0.0107*
(0.0764 ) (0.0599) ( 0.0656)
Panel C: By Price
Low
0.005444 0.005807 0.005420
(0.3556) (0.3158) (0.3444)
Medium
0.004796 0.004878 0.004598
(0.2098) (0.1988) (0.2197)
High
0.000921 0.000943 0.000998
(0.7260) (0.7222) (0.7079)
Pane D: By 12-month Momentum
Low
0.000263 0.000279 0.000118
(0.9523) (0.9493) (0.9786)
Medium
0.006357* 0.006312* 0.006327*
(0.0570) (0.0613) (0.0622)
High
0.003541 0.004054 0.003637
(0.4805) (0.4123) (0.4535)
Part B: By Illiquidity measures
CAPM
Factor
FF Three-Factor Carhart Four-
Panel A: By Amihud’s (2002) Illiquidity Ratio
Low
0.000970 0.001195 0.001151
( 0.7011) (0.6185) (0.6329)
Medium
0.002060 0.002064 0.002049
(0.4617) (0.4538) (0.4596)
High
0.004757 0.005259 0.005095
(0.3046) (0.2515) (0.2668)
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Panel B: By Dollar Trading Volume
Low
0.003608 0.004128 0.003940
(0.4619) (0.3953) (0.4171)
Medium
0.003590 0.003606 0.003520
(0.3500) (0.3444) (0.3576)
High
0.000811 0.000973 0.001025
(0.7891 ) (0.7444) (0.7323)
Panel C: By Price
Low
0.005771 0.006218 0.005951
(0.2812) (0.2459) (0.2647)
Medium
0.000674 0.000829 0.000900
( 0.8577) (0.8253) (0.8114)
High
-0.000173 -0.000106 -0.000157
( 0.9405) (0.9617) (0.9435)
Part C: By Investor Recognition Measures
CAPM
Factor
FF Three-Factor Carhart Four-
Panel A: By Analyst Coverage
No
0.008222 0.008604* 0.008819*
(0.1076) (0.0930) (0.0848)
Low
-0.003879 -0.004080 -0.004381
(0.3769) (0.3531) (0.3129)
High
0.001622 0.001896 0.002019
(0.7197) (0.6710) (0.6518)
Panel B: By the Fraction of Individual Ownership
Low
0.004133 0.004372 0.004236
26
(0.2163) (0.2163) (0.2308)
Medium
-0.000127 -0.000127 -0.000446
( 0.9802) (0.9802) ( 0.9296)
High
0.001997 0.001997 0.002245
(0.6581) (0.6581) (0.6168)
Panel C: By Idiosyncratic Volatility
Low
0.000488 0.000139 -0.000320
( 0.9026) ( 0.9708) (0.9290)
Medium
0.003525 0.004090 0.004347
(0.2828) (0.1916) (0.1567)
High
0.002188 0.002530 0.002499
(0.7270) (0.6867) (0.6920)
Panel D: By Institutional Ownership
Low
0.001519 0.001997 0.002245
(0.7390) (0.6581) (0.6168)
Medium
-0.000060 -0.000127 -0.000446
(0.9907) (0.9802) (0.9296)
High
0.004133 0.004372 0.004236
(0.2467) (0.2163) (0.2308)
SVI and returns in different time horizons
We examine returns associated with SVI over time. We sort stocks into deciles 
based on SVI to identify high SVI and no SVI stocks during the 1 month formation 
period. High SVI stocks are stocks in the winner decile while no SVI stocks are stocks in 
the loser decile. We hold winner and loser stocks for K months [t+1, t+k]. We skip a 
month between the formation period and the holding period to avoid serial correlation. In 
any month, we identify winner (High SVI) and loser (No SVI) stocks and calculate the 
equally weighted raw return of stocks held for K months.
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Table VII shows the results with the winner and loser stocks as well as the 
difference between the winner and loser stocks over the K months holding period. This 
corresponds to a zero cost trading strategy that longs High SVI stocks and shorts no SVI 
stocks. The table reports average raw returns, the CAPM alpha, and the Fama French 
three factor model alpha. Panel A shows the results corresponding to the 1-month 
formation period for the whole sample. Panels B, C, and D report the results 
corresponding to the 1-month formation period for stocks with high book to market ratio, 
small size, and low price, respectively.
Table VII shows the performance of portfolios with [t+1, t+3], [t+1, t+6], [t+7, 
t+12], and [t+13, t+24] holding periods. Panel A indicates that a zero cost strategy that 
longs high SVI stocks and shorts no SVI stocks results in negative returns, though not 
significant. Controlling for the CAPM and the Fama French three factor model, we find 
that the zero cost strategy results in a reversal within three months.
Prior results show that the zero cost trading strategy that longs high SVI stocks 
and shorts no SVI stocks results in significant profits among high book to market and 
small stocks. We explore the performance of the zero cost trading strategy over time 
among high book to market stocks, small size and low priced stocks. Panel B reports the 
results of a zero cost trading strategy that longs high SVI and shorts no SVI stocks over 
time among high book to market stocks. We find that the strategy results in reversal in 
the 3, 6, 7 to 12, and 13 to 24 months holding periods. The CAPM and the Fama French 
three factor alphas show that we have a reversal in the 3 month and 6 month holding 
periods. Panel C shows that the zero cost trading strategy results in negative average raw 
returns during the 3,6, and 13 to 24 months holding periods. The CAPM and the Fama 
French three factor model alphas show reversal during the 3 month holding period. Panel 
D shows that the zero cost trading strategy among low priced stocks results in negative 
average returns in the 3 month and 6 month holding periods. The CAPM and the Fama 
French three factor model alphas show reversal in the 3 month holding period.
We find evidence of negative returns if we long high SVI stocks and short no SVI 
stocks over time. Although our results are not significant, they are in line with the 
predictions of the attention hypothesis of Barber and Odean (2008). Attention results in 
increased buying, which temporarily pushes prices and returns higher. Over time, the
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price pressure is reversed. Da et al (2011) report similar findings. They find that in the 
case of IPOs, increased attention results in high abnormal returns in the first two weeks 
and the effect is reversed in one year.
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SVI and excess returns
In this section, we investigate the effect of investor attention on EREITs excess 
returns. We control for variables that the literature reported as having an effect on 
EREITs returns as well as alternative measures of investor attention.
To show that SVI provides additional explanatory power, it is important to control 
for short sale constraints. To do so, we use institutional ownership, which is a proxy for 
short-sale constraints (Chen et al (2002)). Merton (1997) finds that idiosyncratic 
volatility has an effect on returns. While Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006) find a 
negative relationship, Boehme, Danielsen, Kumar, and Sorescu (2009) report a positive 
relationship. Illiquidity, logTA, and logMB, and systematic risk (beta) are also important 
controls (Sun et al (2010)).
Momentum is another variable that proved to have a significant effect on REIT 
returns (Hung and Glascock (2008) and Ooi, Wang and Webb (2009)). Sun et al (2010) 
report that it is important to consider shadow cost as it has a significant effect on REITs 
returns. Analyst coverage is also another important variable. Khoo, Hartzeil, and Hoesli 
(1993) find that analyst coverage is related to lower REIT returns due to the lower risk 
associated with increased information dissemination. Chemmanur and Yan (2009) use 
advertising expenditures as a proxy for investor attention and find that it has effect on 
short-run and long-run stock returns. Gervais, Kaniel, and Mingelgrin (2001) use trading 
volume as proxy for stock’s visibility and study its impact on returns.
Table VIII presents the cross sectional time series regressions used. Column (1) 
shows that SVI has a significant positive effect on EREITs excess returns at the 1% level. 
Other controls that have significant effect on EREITs returns are beta, logMB, illiquidity, 
and momentum at the 1% level.
Controlling for shadow cost, which is a measure of investor recognition, SVI 
continues to have a significant positive effect on excess returns at the 10% level. Shadow 
cost along with beta, logMB, illiquidity, and momentum are all controls that have a 
significant effect on EREITs returns at the 1% level. LogTA has a significant effect on 
returns at the 10% level. We conclude that SVI provides explanatory power to EREITs 
beyond the effect of investor recognition.
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Columns (3), (4), and (5) show a positive, though insignificant, impact of SVI on 
EREITs excess returns controlling for analyst coverage, advertising expenditures, and 
trading volume; respectively. In column (3), institutional ownership, beta, illiquidity, and 
momentum are all controls that have a significant impact on excess returns at the 1% 
level. Idiosyncratic volatility and logMB have a significant impact at the 5% level. In 
column (4), institutional ownership, beta, idiosyncratic volatility, illiquidity, and 
momentum all are controls that have a significant impact on excess returns at the 1% 
level. In column (5), beta, logMB, illiquidity, momentum, and trading volume 
(logyTvol) have a significant impact on returns at the 1% level. LogTA has a significant 
impact on excess returns at the 5% level.
As previously suggested, Khoo et al (1993) find that analyst coverage is related to 
lower REIT returns due to the lower risk associated with increased information 
dissemination. Merton (1987) also suggests that analyst coverage reduces information 
incompleteness and increases investor recognition. This implies that stocks followed by 
analysts and that have high investor attention are likely to generate lower returns than 
stocks with no analyst coverage and high investor attention.
Table IX-A shows the effect of investor attention on excess returns by splitting 
the sample between stocks with no analyst following and stocks with analyst following. 
The table shows that, for the full sample, SVI results in significantly positive excess 
returns at the 1% level. It also shows that stocks with no analyst following generate 
significantly positive excess return at the 1% level. Stocks with analyst following have a 
positive effect on excess returns, though not significant. The results show that the 
positive effect of investor attention on excess returns in the full sample is driven by 
stocks with no analyst coverage.
Table IX-B presents the effect of investor attention on excess returns by 
controlling for investor recognition. The table shows the results for the whole sample as 
well as by subsamples of no analyst coverage and with analyst coverage. The table 
shows that, for the whole sample, SVI results in positive and significant excess returns. 
For stocks with no analyst coverage, SVI results in positive and significant EREITs 
excess returns. For the subsample of stocks with analyst following, SVI results in 
negative but insignificant excess returns. Therefore, controlling for investor recognition,
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increased SVI results in positive and significant excess returns and the results are driven 
by stocks with no analyst coverage.
In summary, we find that increased investor attention, measured by SVI, results in 
positive price pressure and higher excess returns, even after controlling for investor 
recognition among EREITs. The effect is driven by stocks that are characterized by 
information incompleteness and opacity, such as stocks with no analyst coverage. We 
conclude that our results provide further support to the attention hypothesis of Barber and 
Odean (2008) and Merton’s (1987) investor recognition hypothesis.
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Table VIII
The effect of SVI and other investor attention measures on returns
In this table, we perform monthly regressions examining the effect of SVI on return along with 
alternative measures of attention. The dependent variable is monthly excess returns on the 
company stock. Independent variables are SVI, institutional ownership, idiosyncratic risk, size, 
MB, illiquidity, and momentum. Regression (1) examines the effect of SVI on returns. 
Regression (2), (3), (4), and (5) control for shadow cost, analyst coverage, advertising 
expenditures to sales, and annual turnover. Definitions are available in Table I. *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intercept -0.00220* -0.00382*** -0.00138 -0.09045 -0.00615***
(0.0766) (0.0021) (0.4082) (0.4474) (0.0005)
SVI 0.00000782*** 0.00000419* 0.00000360 0.00030235 0.00000307
(0.0025) (0.0977) (0.1763) (0.1850) (0.2387)
instown -0.00059772 -0.00058815 0.00300*** 0.22399*** -0.00052411
(0.1759) (0.1761) (0.0010) (<.0001) (0.2429)
beta 0.00049137*** 0.00051572*** 0.00102*** 0.00627*** 0.00049418***
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
idiovol 0.00041174 0.00045579 -0.04143** 2.87212*** 0.00060470
(0.5315) (0.4759) (0.0130) (<.0001) (0.3548)
logTA -0.00002806 0.00029605* -0.00029395 -0.01915 -0.00073560**
(0.8653) (0.0728) (0.2665) (0.1923) (0.0104)
logMB 0.00116*** 0.00075462*** 0.00072020** -0.00014470 0.00100***
(<.0001) (0.0066) (0.0269) (0.9966) (0.0005)
ILLIO*10"5 0.00000308*** 0.00000426*** -0.00048306*** -0.07230*** 0.00000421***
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
Momentum 0.04182*** 0.04063*** 0.04090*** 0.08538*** 0.04183***
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0016) (<.0001)
Shadow cost 0.00090850***
(<.00011
ANUM -0.00034059
(0.4843)
Advtosales -0.01267
(0.5343)
logyTvol 0.00074508***
(0.0010)
Observations 234319 224465 208345 2276 229412
R2 0.0237 0.0244 0.0265 0.1089 0.0240
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Table IX-A
The effect of SVI by analyst coverage
In this table, we perform monthly regressions examining the effect of SVI on returns controlling 
for alternative measures of attention. The dependent variable is monthly excess returns on the 
company stock. Independent variables are SVI, institutional ownership, idiosyncratic risk, size, 
MB, illiquidity, and momentum. The results for the full sample are reported. Results for 
subsamples with no analyst coverage and with analyst coverage are also reported. Definitions are 
available in Table I. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively.
Full sample NoANUM With ANUM
Intercept -0.00220 -0.01384*** -0.00101
(0.0766)* (0.0001) (0.5237)
SVI 0.00000782*** 0.00013789*** 0.00000326
(0.0025) (<.0001) (0.2131)
instown -0.00059772 -0.00147*** 0.00298***
(0.1759) (0.0099) (0.0011)
beta 0.00049137*** -0.00446*** 0.00102***
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
idiovol 0.00041174 0.00060718 -0.04001**
(0.5315) (0.4019) (0.0157)
logTA -0.00002806 0.00171*** -0.00041333**
(0.8653) (0.0068) (0.0408)
logMB 0.00116*** 0.00142* 0.00072938**
(<.0001) (0.0733) (0.0249)
ILLIQ*10"5 0.00000308*** 0.00000237*** -0.00048237***
(<.0001) (0.0007) (<.0001)
Momentum 0.04182*** 0.05068*** 0.04091***
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
Observations 234319 25974 208345
R2 0.0237 0.0466 0.0265
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Table IX-B
The effect of SVI by analyst coverage, controlling for investor recognition
In this table, we perform monthly regressions examining the effect of SVI on returns controlling 
for alternative measures of attention. The dependent variable is monthly excess returns on the 
company stock. Independent variables are SVI, institutional ownership, idiosyncratic risk, size, 
MB, illiquidity, momentum, and shadow cost. The results for the full sample are reported.
Results for subsamples with no analyst coverage and with analyst coverage are also reported. 
Definitions are available in Table I. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively.
Full Sample NoANUM With ANUM
Intercept -0.00382*** -0.00305 -0.01365***
(0.0021) (0.4580) (<.0001)
SVI 0.00000419* 0.00017264*** -0.00000159
(0.0977) (<.0001) (0.5298)
instown -0.00058815 -0.00119** 0.00381***
(0.1761) (0.0471) (<.0001)
beta 0.00051572*** -0.00438*** 0.00113***
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
idiovol 0.00045579 0.00107 0.33733***
(0.4759) (0.2160) (<.0001)
logTA 0.00029605* -0.00031893 0.00037988*
(0.0728) (0.6601) (0.0553)
logMB 0.00075462*** 0.00317*** 0.00194***
(0.0066) (0.0002) (<.0001)
ILLIO*10“5 0.00000426*** 0.00000270*** -0.00007202
(<.0001) (0.0004) (0.5499)
Momentum 0.04063*** 0.05867*** 0.03936***
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
Shadow cost 0.00090850*** -0.00113 0.00097512***
(<.0001) (0.2578) (<.0001)
Observations 224465 22335 202130
R2 0.0244 0.0504 0.0280
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SUMMARY
Traditional asset pricing models assume that prices immediately adjust to reflect 
all available information. However, Kahneman (1973) reports that attention is a scarce 
cognitive resource. This means that investors are limited in terms of the amount of 
information they can process, which suggests that prices may not immediately adjust to 
reflect all available information.
In this study, we investigate the effect of investor attention on EREITs returns.
We find that an increase in SVI, a direct investor attention proxy, results in significant 
positive returns. The univariate analysis shows that this is especially true for EREITs 
that are small, with high book to market ratio, low past month return, low price, and are 
highly illiquid. The multivariate analysis using the CAPM, the Fama-French (1993) 
three-factor model, and the Carhart (1997) four-factor model shows that increased 
investor attention results in higher returns for stocks that are small and with high book to 
market ratio. We show that the SVI effect does not persist due to impediments to trade. 
Rather, SVI improves investor recognition, which results in high average returns. 
Investigating the effect of SVI on returns over time, we find evidence of return reversal, 
which is in line with the expectations of the attention hypothesis.
We also investigate the impact of SVI on excess returns controlling for alternative 
investor attention measures and other EREITs returns determinants. We find that 
increases in SVI results in high excess returns. Splitting the sample between EREITs 
with no analyst coverage and those with analyst coverage, we find that the effect is driven 
by stocks with no analyst coverage.
We conclude that SVI improves investor recognition and results in significant 
excess returns among EREITs that suffer from poor information dissemination and high 
information incompleteness. These findings are in line with the expectations of the 
attention hypothesis of Barber and Odean (2008) and Merton’s (1987) investor 
recognition hypothesis.
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CHAPTER 2
INVESTOR ATTENTION AND THE OPEN MARKET REPURCHASES POST
ANNOUNCEMENT RETURNS
ABSTRACT
Investors are limited in terms of the information they can process. According to 
the attention hypothesis, under-reaction in asset pricing is a result of the brain’s 
limitations in processing large amounts of information. The attention hypothesis is used 
to generate insights into stock repurchases price drift. Using a sample of 318 firms that 
made repurchase announcements between 2004 and 2008 and which have weekly search 
volume data in Google Trends, we find that investor attention has an effect on the 
repurchase drift for stocks during the first year following the announcement. More 
specifically, we find that high abnormal search volume leads to a positive effect on 
cumulative returns during the first year following the announcement for small stocks, 
stocks with high idiosyncratic risk, low market to book ratio, and low past return. Low 
abnormal search volume signals a decrease in investor attention and results in negative 
returns among all stocks. The results provide further support to the attention hypothesis.
INTRODUCTION
The efficient market hypothesis suggests that stock prices reflect all available 
information (Fama 1970). However, empirical evidence has shown several instances 
where the market efficiency hypothesis was violated. For example, Ikenberry, 
Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) document stock price under-reaction following open 
market repurchase announcements. Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) find evidence 
of under-reaction to earnings announcements as well as momentum effects. Michaely, 
Thaler and Womack (1995) document evidence of drift following dividend initiations and 
omissions. Similarly, Ikenberry, Rankine and Stice (1996) find evidence of drift 
following stock splits.
Prior research has shown that the existence of pricing anomalies is due to limits to 
arbitrage (Pontiff (2006), Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Chen,
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Hong, and Stein (2002), Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003), and Doukas, Kim, and Pantzalis 
(2010)). The arbitrage risk hypothesis suggests that asset mispricing is due to the 
presence of idiosyncratic risk, which acts as a deterrent to arbitrage activity. Thus, the 
higher a firm’s idiosyncratic risk, the more likely it is to be mispriced. By the same 
token, the lower a firm’s idiosyncratic risk, the more likely it is to trade close to 
fundamental value due to arbitrage activity and involvement of professional traders. 
Another strand of literature attributes mispricing to investor psychological biases. Hong, 
Harrison and Stein 1999). Barberis et al (1998) and Daniel, Hirshleifer, and 
Subrahmanyam (1998)) attribute mispricing to cognitive biases, such as sentiment, 
conservatism, or over-confidence.
This paper focuses of the anomaly of stock price under-reaction following 
repurchase announcements. Open market share repurchases offer a situation where the 
efficient market hypothesis is violated. In a now classical paper, Ikenberry et al (1995) 
examine the long-run stock price performance of firms that announced open market 
repurchase programs between 1980 and 1990. They show that the average abnormal four 
year returns following the repurchase announcement is 12.1%. The average abnormal 
return is even higher for value stocks, amounting to 45.3%. Later papers have supported 
these findings and found that open market share repurchases are associated with positive 
abnormal returns up to three years following the announcement (Stephens and Weisbach 
(1998), Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (2000), Jagannathan, Murali, and 
Stephens (2003), Chan, Ikenberry, and Lee (2004), Chan, Ikenberry, Lee and Wang 
(2010)). Ikenberry et al (1995) suggest that the reason for such drift is that the market 
fails to immediately incorporate information following a repurchase announcement. In 
other words, the delayed response shows evidence of under-reaction.
To explain the stock price post repurchase drift anomaly, we use a model that 
accounts for limits to arbitrage as well as uses a finance behavioral concept, which is 
investor attention. It is important to consider this question for several reasons. First, post 
repurchase price drift has not been studied from the perspective of investor attention. 
Most studies examine the link between under-reaction and the attention hypothesis in the 
context of earnings (Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003), Hirshleifer et al 2004, Hou and 
Moskowitz (2005), Cohen and Frazzini (2008), Hou et al 2008, Hirshleifer et al 2009,
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and DellaVigna and Pollet (2009). The impact of attention on returns following stock 
buybacks is lacking. Second, under-reaction is stronger among firms characterized by 
high idiosyncratic risk (Ikenberry et al (1995)). Such mispricing persists due to limits to 
arbitrage that result from high idiosyncratic risk (Pontiff (2006), Shleifer and Vishny 
1997, Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Chen et al (2002), Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003), and 
Doukas et al (2010)). This paper seeks to identify the impact that investor attention has 
on the post repurchase price drift given different levels of limits to arbitrage and 
idiosyncratic risk. Finally, this paper adds to the existing literature by using a novel and 
direct proxy of individual investor attention; Google’s Search Volume Index (SVI) (Da et 
al 2011). SVI represents a term’s total number of searches scaled by its time-series 
average and is produced weekly using Google’s aggregate search frequency. Given that 
search is a measure of attention and that Google is a commonly used search engine, its 
reported search logs are likely to be representative of that of the entire population and, as 
a result, appropriate in measuring investor attention (Da et al 2011).
The univariate analysis shows that an increase in Google’s search volume, as 
measured by Abnormal Search Volume Index (ASVI), results in positive and significant 
cumulative returns for all stocks. The univariate analysis also shows that ASVI has the 
largest and most significant impact on stocks that are small, with low market to book 
ratio, are low priced, are more illiquid and are with low analyst coverage. The 
multivariate analysis reports that ASVI results in higher cumulative returns during the 
first year following the repurchase announcement. The results are driven by small stocks. 
Further analysis shows that high ASVI results in positive and significant effect on 
cumulative returns among stocks with high idiosyncratic risk, low market to book ratio, 
and low past return. We conclude that retail investor attention, as measured by Google’s 
ASVI, increases buying among stocks that suffer from limits to arbitrage. This reduces 
mispricing and results in the impounding of the repurchase announcement information 
into stock prices. This is in line with the predictions of investor attention hypothesis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The first section presents the 
theoretical development. Methodology and sample description are provided in the 
second section. The third section summarizes the findings. The final section concludes 
the paper.
45
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT
Ikenberry et al (1995) suggest that the reason for the stock price post repurchase 
drift is that the market fails to immediately incorporate information following a 
repurchase announcement. The delayed response shows evidence of under-reaction. 
Under-reaction refers to the slow incorporation of information in the stock price of a firm 
following good news shock (Ikenberry et al 1995). It causes the stock price to trade 
below fundamental value and to exhibit short term trends in returns (Barberis et al
(1998)).
In the behavioral finance literature, under-reaction is attributed to two reasons; 
conservatism (Barberis et al 1998) and investors’ limited attention/ recognition (Merton 
(1987), Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003), DellaVigna and Pollet (2009), Peng (2005), 
DellaVigna and Pollet (2007), Peng and Xiong (2006), Hou, Peng, and Xiong (2008), and 
Hirshleifer, Seongyeon and Teoh (2009)).
Conservatism suggests that “individuals are slow to change their beliefs in the 
face o f new evidence” Barberis et al (1998, p. 315). Under conservatism, investors are 
aware of the newly available information, but they react to it partially. According to 
Griffin and Tversky (1992), under-reaction is a result of the weight and strength given to 
a news item. Strength refers to the importance given to the new evidence. Weight refers 
to the credence and plausibility that is given to that news item. Under-reaction results 
when a piece of news that is credible is given less importance. This means that under­
reaction happens when a news item that has high weight is given less strength.
According to the attention hypothesis, under-reaction is not so much a result of 
conservatism, but is a result of investor inattention. Under-reaction, thus, is a result of 
the brain’s limitations in processing large amounts of information.
Attention is a scarce cognitive resource that helps an individual deploy more 
mental faculty to one object or thought relative to others (Kahneman (1973)). Due to the 
large amount of information that investors receive and given that attention is a scarce 
cognitive resource, investors are limited in terms of the information they can process 
(Cohen and Frazzini 2008). As a result, they select the type of information to which they 
can devote attention. Attention helps investors incorporate available information into
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their wealth (Karlsson et al 2005). Inattention results in the slow incorporation of 
information in asset pricing, which results in under-reaction.
The Attention hypothesis of Barber and Odean (2008) suggests that individual 
investors are net-buyers of “attention-grabbing” stocks. Prior to buying, investors 
consider a set of stocks they research and to which they pay attention. When buying, they 
choose from this set of stocks. The attention hypothesis advances that increased attention 
leads to increased buying, which temporarily pushes prices higher and results in higher 
returns.
The attention hypothesis is closely related to the investor recognition hypothesis 
advanced by Merton (1987). The hypothesis suggests that in markets with incomplete 
information, investors do not know about all securities. Consequently, the lower the 
number of investors that know about a security, the lower is its investor recognition and 
vice versa. Merton posits that stocks with low investor recognition require high returns 
to compensate their holders for the risk they bear. Before investors recognize a stock, 
they must first pay attention to it. Attention is, therefore, a pre-requisite to investor 
recognition (Ding and Hou 2011).
Several models have examined asset pricing using the attention hypothesis. 
Huberman and Regev (2001) document the case of a firm’s stock whose price soared 
dramatically following the publication of a related news item in the New York Times.
The news was stale, though, because it was published in other media outlets months 
earlier but received no attention. Hirshleifer, Hou, Teoh, and Zhang (2004) show that 
investors pay more attention to accounting profitability compared to cash profitability, 
which leads to the former predicting long-run returns. Hou and Moskowitz (2005) find 
that stock price delay is related to proxies of investor recognition. Cohen and Frazzini 
(2008) provide evidence that investor inattention exists, which explains the return 
predictability for firms that are economically linked. Barber and Odean (2008) show that 
investors’ buying and selling is driven by highly publicized news and events, which 
suggests that investor attention is instrumental in asset pricing. Hou, Peng, and Xiong
(2008) find that over-reaction in stock prices is associated with increased investor 
attention; whereas under-reaction is caused by investor inattention. Hirshleifer, Lim and 
Teoh (2009) suggest that the immediate price response to earnings surprises is weaker
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and the post-earnings announcement drift is stronger when a firm’s earnings are 
announced in a day that is crowded by other earnings announcements. This suggests that 
investor attention and distraction play a role in asset pricing. DellaVigna and Pollet
(2009) find that earnings announcements made on Fridays have a 15% lower immediate 
response and a 70% higher delayed response. The authors attribute these results to high 
investor inattention on Fridays. Engelberg, Sasseville, and Williams (2012) provide 
further evidence that supports the effect of investor attention on asset pricing. Their 
research documents the positive relationship between total viewership, especially among 
wealthy viewers, and the overnight returns associated with stocks mentioned by Jim 
Cramer in his popular CNBC show Mad Money.
All in all, these studies have found that limited investor attention is responsible 
for under-reaction. The more attention a firm receives, the more quickly new information 
is incorporated into its stock price. When a firm receives less attention, new information 
is not immediately incorporated into its stock price, which results in price under-reaction.
Prior studies have used different measures to capture investor attention. Gervais, 
Kaniel, and Mingelgrin (2001) used trading volume as an indicator of stock’s visibility 
and investigated its impact on future abnormal returns. Hou et al (2008) used it to assess 
price and momentum strategies. Chemmanur and Yan (2009), Grullon, Kanatas, and 
Weston (2004), and Lou (2014) used advertising expenditures as a proxy for investor 
attention to study its effect on short-run and long-run stock returns, the presence of 
individual and institutional investors and stock liquidity, and short-term stock excess 
returns and manager timing; respectively. Barber and Odean (2008) used prior excess 
returns to measure investor attention and found that it predicts future abnormal returns. 
They also used a stock’s appearance in the media as a proxy of investor attention and 
found that it results in excess returns. Similarly, Yuan (2008) investigated news 
headlines’ influence on investor trading behavior. Seasholes and Wu (2007) used price 
limits as a proxy for investor attention and found that Shanghai stocks that reach price 
limits enjoy higher returns, higher turnover, and higher media attention.
Da et al (2011) argue that proxies such as trading volume, advertising, excess 
returns, news and media reports, and price limits do not truly reflect investor attention. 
They suggest that a stock’s excess returns or abnormal trading volume may not only be
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due to abnormal investor attention, but to other factors. In addition, appearance in the 
news may result in increased investor attention, but not always (Huberman and Regev 
(2001)). In fact, often times, investors are overwhelmed by the amount of financial news 
and information reported in the media (Cohen and Frazzini 2008). Therefore, a more 
direct proxy, such as SVI, is needed to measure investor attention.
SVI is considered a proxy that is specific to individual investors because these 
latter use the internet to obtain financial information (Da et al 2011). More sophisticated 
institutional investors use information services such as Reuters and Bloomberg terminals. 
SVI, thus, enables the examination of the direct impact of retail investors’ attention on 
the stocks of firms that announced stock buybacks.
Individual investors are considered for the purpose of this study because they are 
more likely to buy “attention grabbing” stocks (Barber and Odean 2008). Attention is not 
as limited for institutional investors as it is for individual investors. Institutional 
investors allocate a significant amount of time to stock research as well as use advanced 
technology to aid in their search. Thus, to study the effect o f attention on the returns 
following stock buybacks, a measure of individual investor attention, such as the SVI, is 
appropriate.
More specifically, we look at Abnormal SVI (ASVI), which is defined as “the (log) 
SVI during the current week minus the (log) median SVI during the previous eight 
weeks” Da et al (2011. p 1463). ASVI depicts abnormal attention or attention shock. We 
measure the ASVI for each week following the repurchase announcement and study its 
impact on prices and returns.
An increase in ASVI is expected to result in positive abnormal returns following 
the repurchase announcement. The attention hypothesis of Barber and Odean (2008) 
predicts that attention results in increased buying, which pushes returns higher. This 
implies that as investors’ attention increases, the repurchase announcement news gets 
incorporated in the stock price. We hypothesize that:
H I :  A n  i n c r e a s e  in  A S V I  r e s u l t s  in  p o s i t i v e  a b n o r m a l  r e t u r n s  f o l l o w i n g  th e  r e p u r c h a s e  
a n n o u n c e m e n t
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In the finance literature, mispricing anomalies, such as under-reaction, are due to 
the presence of idiosyncratic risk and limits to arbitrage (Doukas et al 2010). The 
arbitrage risk hypothesis suggests that mispricing is higher among high idiosyncratic risk 
stocks compared to low idiosycraytic risk stocks (Pontiff (1996), Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997), Gromb andVayanos (2002), Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002), and Hirshleifer and 
Teoh (2003), and Doukas et al (2010). To hedge against fundamental risk, arbitrageurs 
have to take an opposite position in a stock that is a close substitute to the mispriced 
stock. Given that arbitrageurs are risk averse (Pontiff 2006) and that high idiosyncratic 
risk stocks have fewer close substitutes, such stocks continue to be mispriced due to lack 
of professional investors’ involvement.
Idiosyncratic risk is a risk that is specific to the firm and that is independent of the 
market risk (Fu 2009). The Fama French model is used to estimate it. Each week, excess 
returns are regressed on the excess returns on the market portfolio, the difference in 
returns between small and large stocks, and the difference in returns between high market 
to book stocks and low market to book stocks.
Ri(t) -  Rf(t) = a  + p 1 (Rm(t) -  Rf(t)) + p2SMB(t) + p3HML(t) + e,(t) (1)
Idiosyncratic risk is measured as the standard error of the model’s residuals. 
Weekly stock returns obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
and weekly factor data are obtained from the Kenneth R. French’s website.2 Market to 
book ratio and past week return are two other measures used to proxy for limits to 
arbitrage.
Stocks that are characterized by high idiosyncratic risk, low market to book ratio 
and low past week return are stocks that suffer from limits to arbitrage. Such stocks tend 
to be mispriced. Brandt, Brav, Graham, and Kumar (2009) also report that these stocks 
tend to be dominated by retail investors. An increase in ASVI results from an increase in 
retail investor attention. This latter in turn results in increased buying, which pushes 
prices and returns higher (Barber and Odean (2008)).
2 http://m ba.tuck.dartm outh.edu/paees/facultv/ken.french/data librarv.html
50
We expect that following a repurchase announcement, an increase in ASVI among 
firms with high idiosyncratic risk, low market to book ratio, and low past return to result 
in increased buying, which results in higher cumulative returns. We hypothesize that:
H 2 :  A n  i n c r e a s e  in  A S V I  a m o n g  s t o c k s  w i t h  h ig h  id i o s y n c r a t i c  r i s k ,  l o w  m a r k e t  t o  b o o k  
r a t io ,  a n d  l o w  p a s t  r e tu r n  r e s u l t s  in  p o s i t i v e  a n d  s i g n i f i c a n t  c u m u l a t i v e  r e t u r n s
SAMPLE AND DATA
The sample is comprised of all NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX listed firms that 
announced open market repurchase announcements between 2004 and 2008. The 
analysis starts in 2004 because it is the first year for which SVI data is available. It ends 
in 2008 to allow studying the effect of the announcement on stock returns three years 
following the announcement date. Similar to Da et al (2011), the American Deposit 
Receipts (ADRs), closed-end funds, real estate investment trusts (REITs), limited 
partnerships (LPs), and stocks below five dollars are excluded from the sample. Firms 
that have announced accelerated repurchase announcements are excluded from this study. 
Stock repurchase announcements are obtained from the Thomson One database. Firm 
accounting data is obtained from COMPUSTAT and returns are obtained from CRSP. 
Analyst data is obtained from I/B/E/S, news coverage is obtained from Factiva, and 
Sentiment data is from Barron’s through Factiva. Closely held shares and the number of 
common shares outstanding are obtained from Worlscope.
To be included in the sample, a firm must have complete information in Google 
Trends, COMPUSTAT, CRSP, I/B/E/S, Factiva, and Worldscope databases. Of the 2,452 
companies that announced open share repurchase announcements, 318 companies are 
included in the study with a total of 49,600 firm-week observations.
Cumulative returns are calculated every week for up to three years following the 
repurchase announcement. SVI reports are obtained through Google Trends at 
fhttp://www.google.com/trends). In this study, SVI is obtained using each company’s 
ticker symbol (Da et al 2011). The ticker symbol is used to capture the search logs that 
are made for financial and investment purposes. It is also used to avoid accounting for
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searches that pertain to the companies’ products and services. For example, to obtain the 
amount of searches done by investors interested in Bank of America, we input its ticker 
symbol “BAC” in Google trends instead of “Bank of America”. The use of the bank’s 
name may include searches done by the bank’s customers instead of interested investors. 
In addition, all SVI reports are obtained from the Finance Category in Google Trends to 
reduce noise.
In this study, the Abnormal SVI (ASVI) for each week following the repurchase 
announcement is used. To examine the impact of Abnormal SVI on cumulative abnormal 
returns, we follow Da et al (2011) method in using Fama-Macbeth (1973) regression for 
panel data. We regress weekly cumulative returns on ASVI and control for other 
attention proxies such as news coverage, turnover, analyst coverage, advertising 
expenditures, and last week’s excess returns. Investor sentiment, measured using the 
consumer confidence index and published by the Conference Board, is also used as a 
control variable in this study. We also include other controls used in the share repurchase 
literature. These are firm size, undervaluation measured by the market to book ratio, 
excess cash flow, excess debt capacity, ownership concentration, the size of the 
repurchase program, and the number of times the same company announced a repurchase 
program during the three years following the announcement.
To account for the effect of news on post-repurchase announcement returns, we use 
Tetlock (2010) news variables; “News dummy” and “log (1 + log(number of news in the 
last 52 weeks)”. Prior research indicates that the presence of news has a significant effect 
on ASVI, and as a result on returns (Da et al 2011). In addition, the log of the number of 
news reported in the last 52 weeks has a significant and negative relationship with ASVI. 
This is expected because no abnormal attention is given to stocks that are widely covered. 
Therefore, for each week following the repurchase announcement, we identify whether 
news stories related to each firm have been reported. The dummy variable takes on the 
value of 1 if news concerning the company appears in the newswires that week and a 
value of 0 otherwise. News data is obtained from the Dow Jones archive, which 
encompasses the Dow Jones News Service as well as the Wall Street Journal articles.
The Dow Jones archive is accessed through Factiva.
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Weekly trading volume is obtained from Compustat. Analyst coverage is measured 
using the variable log(l+ # of analysts). The number of analysts is obtained from the 
I/E/B/S database. Advertising expenditures are measured using last year’s ratio of 
advertising expense to sales. Advertising and sales data are obtained from 
COMPUSTAT. If a firm’s data is missing from the database, the ratio takes the value of 
0. Another independent variable that is used is last week’s absolute excess returns.
A variable that has influential impact on retail investors’ attention is sentiment (Da et al 
2011). Investor Sentiment is defined as “a belief about future cash flows and investment 
risks that is not justified by the facts at hand.” Baker and Wurgler (2007, p. 129). It is 
important to examine this variable because individual investors are more likely to be 
affected by sentiment compared to institutional investors (Da et al 2011). We use the 
American Association of Individual Investors (AAII) weekly sentiment measure. AAII 
data was hand collected from Barron’s through Factiva. Investor sentiment is calculated 
using the spread between the percentage of bullish investors and bearish investors each 
week (Brown 2004).
We also use share repurchases literature controls. These include market 
capitalization, market to book ratio, excess cash, debt to assets, ownership concentration 
measured by closely held shares, size of the repurchase program, and the number of times 
the repurchase announcement is made during the period of study. Table X-A presents the 
variables used in the study and their definitions
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Table X-A 
Variables Definition
Variable Definition
SCAR Standardized Cumulative Abnormal Returns
SVI Monthly Google's search volume index using each company’s ticker 
symbol
ASVI Calculated using the (log) SVI during the current week minus the (log) 
median SVI during the previous eight weeks
News dummy or 
Newsd
Takes the value of 1 if the company has news reported in the week in the 
Dow Jones News Service and the Wall Street Journal; 0 otherwise
News log (1 + log(number of news in the last 52 weeks)
Trading volume Weekly trading volume obtained from Compustat
Analyst Calculated using log(l+ # of analysts). The number of analysts is 
obtained from the I/E/B/S database
Adv to sales last year’s ratio of advertising expense to sales. Advertising and sales 
data are obtained from COMPUSTAT. If a firm’s data is missing from 
the database, the ratio takes the value of 0
Xret last week’s absolute excess returns to the value weighted index
Sentiment The American Association of Individual Investors (AAII) weekly 
sentiment measure
MKTcap the year-end log (market capitalization) prior to the announcement
MB Year-end market to book value ratio prior to the announcement
Excess cash Compustat’s operating income after depreciation to total assets prior to 
the repurchase announcement
Debt to assets Year-end ratio of total debt to total assets prior to the repurchase 
announcement
Closelyheld Year-end ratio of closely held shares to the total number of common 
stocks at the company’s year-end prior to the announcement. Data is 
obtained from Worldscope
Program size The ratio of the value of the buyback program to the year-end value of 
common total equity prior to the repurchase announcement, expressed as 
a percentage
Announce times The number of times the same company announced a repurchase 
program during the three years following the announcement
IR Standard error of residuals in the Fama French three factor model
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RESULTS
Table X-B displays the summary statistics. Panel A shows the descriptive 
statistics for the whole sample. Panel B gives descriptive statistics for firms with low 
idiosyncratic risk and Panel C displays the results for firms with high idiosyncratic risk. 
We can see that stocks with low idiosyncratic risk have slightly higher ASVI, higher 
market capitalization, higher advertising expenses, more analyst coverage, higher trading 
volume, higher market to book ratio, make more repurchase announcements, higher debt, 
and have more news coverage compared to stocks with high idiosyncratic risk. Low 
idiosyncratic firms tend to also make repurchase announcements during times with 
positive sentiment. Firms with high idiosyncratic risk make repurchase announcements 
during times characterized by negative sentiment.
On the other hand, stocks with high idiosyncratic risk have higher cumulative 
returns, higher prior excess returns, more closely held shares, higher repurchase program 
size, and higher excess cash.
Table X-B 
Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for the whole sample
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev Range
SCAR 50552 0.1122 0.12871 1.054389 24.2164
ASVI 51324 0.003186 0 0.086261 2.109145
Log market 
cap
51324 3.540039 3.568993 0.881031 4.13109
XRET 51324 0.034989 0.021836 0.046589 2.355841
adv to sales 51324 0.014392 0 0.033133 0.322015
analyst 51324 0.257771 0.30103 0.241388 1.255273
Trading
Volume
51324 19.79639 5.738012 43.77001 958.9926
Sentiment 51324 0.887279 0.9 17.60135 107.6
MB 51324 3.237076 2.251 9.345449 212.857
announ times 51324 1.920973 2 1.071817 7
Debt to assets 51324 0.207484 0.180272 0.19027 1.599878
closelyheld 51324 0.179327 0.121732 0.220211 1.702658
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program size 51324 95.12553 14.48069 1001.9 15530.36
Excesscash 51324 0.107341 0.091006 0.093767 0.749614
news 51324 1.684787 1.633469 0.666394 3.863025
news dummy 51324 0.491505 0 0.501722 9
IR 51324 0.054722 0.0491 0.024721 0.2232
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for stocks with low idiosyncratic risk
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev Range
SCAR 16619 0.06348 0.072359 0.90981 9.41378
ASVI 17114 0.003225 0 0.08188 1.633469
Log market 
cap
17114 4.009809 4.054024 0.749787 3.865352
XRET 17114 0.020714 0.014869 0.020619 0.238994
adv to sales 17114 0.0168 0 0.043158 0.322015
analyst 17114 0.299819 0.30103 0.246574 1.255273
Trading
Volume
17114 26.80179 9.227263 56.50214 880.0171
Sentiment 17114 4.333248 4.8 17.56832 107.6
MB 17114 3.68872 2.743 15.54106 212.857
announ times 17114 2.475167 2 1.278219 7
Debt to assets 17114 0.225921 0.196981 0.171447 0.683427
closelyheld 17114 0.107525 0.037814 0.148247 1.1352
program size 17114 9.763087 14.01044 278.4333 13798.9
Excesscash 17114 0.110443 0.08197 0.104047 0.705612
news 17114 1.907308 1.869232 0.710281 3.480295
news dummy 17114 0.583674 1 0.498386 9
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics for stocks with high idiosyncratic risk
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev Range
SCAR 16676 0.181889 0.175609 1.210754 21.83687
ASVI 17143 0.00311 0 0.089437 2.109145
Log market 
cap
17143 3.170043 3.130262 0.82642 3.767566
XRET 17143 0.052297 0.033747 0.067116 2.35584
adv to sales 17143 0.014455 0 0.027366 0.172483
analyst 17143 0.230358 0.30103 0.234822 0.90309
Trading
Volume
17143 16.39409 2.846451 39.37906 958.9924
Sentiment 17143 -2.23538 -1.2 17.1013 98.3
MB 17143 3.32886 2.103 4.150611 32.744
announ times 17143 1.467538 1 0.717536 3
56
Debt to assets 17143 0.210862 0.180272 0.227314 1.599878
closelyheld 17143 0.227266 0.151981 0.219212 0.811141
program size 17143 149.7983 14.6008 1295.38 13689.58
Excesscash 17143 0.112995 0.104466 0.09136 0.476368
news 17143 1.537582 1.462398 0.60543 3.863025
news dummy 17143 0.415972 0 0.492903 1
Table XI reports the cumulative returns of stocks double sorted by ASVI and 
different firm characteristics. Stocks are first sorted into terciles by size, market to book 
ratio, past weekly return, price, illiquidity, and analyst coverage. Terciles 1 and 3 refer to 
the lowest and highest value of each characteristic, respectively. Each characteristic- 
based tercile is further sorted into three ASVI portfolios: no ASVI, low ASVI, and high 
ASVI. Stocks with no ASVI are first identified. The remaining stocks are divided into 
low and high ASVI groups using the median value o f  ASVI. The cumulative return o f 
each portfolio is then computed.
Examining all stocks in the sample, the table shows that the average cumulative 
return for stocks with no, low, and high ASVI are -0.07,0.08, and 0.09 respectively. The 
difference in the average cumulative return between no ASVI and high ASVI stocks is - 
0.16, which is significant at the 1% level. The results show that, overall, stocks that 
generate high ASVI earn higher cumulative returns.
Double sorting stocks by ASVI and size in panel A, we find that stocks that 
generate high ASVI, regardless of size, earn significantly higher cumulative returns than 
stocks with no ASVI. Small stocks with high ASVI generate the highest cumulative 
returns compared to small stocks with no ASVI. Panels B shows that all stocks with high 
ASVI earn higher returns than stocks with no ASVI. Stocks characterized by high ASVI 
and low market to book ratio earn the highest cumulative returns compared to low market 
to book ratio stocks with no ASVI. Panel C reports that all stocks with high ASVI, 
regardless of their past return, earn significantly higher returns relative to stocks with no 
ASVI. Panels D, E, and F support prior findings and show that stocks with high ASVI 
earn higher cumulative returns than stocks with no ASVI. High ASVI stocks that are low
57
priced, are highly illiquid, and with low analyst coverage earn the highest cumulative 
returns.
Table XII examines the effect of ASVI on cumulative abnormal returns during the 
first 4 weeks, 5 to 52 weeks, 53 to 104 weeks, and 105 to 156 weeks following the 
announcement. It shows that, controlling for other attention measures, an increase in 
ASVI in the first year following the repurchase announcement has a positive and 
significant impact on cumulative returns. During the second and the third year, ASVI 
shocks do not have a significant impact on returns.
The interaction between market cap and ASVI has a negative and significant 
impact on cumulative returns during the first year. This suggests that the increase in 
cumulative returns following shocks in attention is stronger for small firms. The table 
also shows that firm size, measured by market capitalization, is negatively and 
significantly related to cumulative returns from week 4 to the end of the third year. This 
indicates that smaller firms have stronger cumulative returns and the strongest post 
repurchase stock price drift.
The table also shows that lagged absolute abnormal returns have a negative and 
significant impact on cumulative returns during the first year following the 
announcement. However, during the second and third year, an increase in lagged 
absolute abnormal returns results in positive and significant impact on future cumulative 
returns. Advertising expenses is another attention measure that is used as a control. We 
see that it has a positive and significant effect on cumulative returns during the second 
and third year following the repurchase announcement. Advertising has no significant 
impact during the first year after the repurchase announcement. Analyst coverage and 
trading volume are both attention measures that have a significant and positive impact on 
returns during the first, second, and third year after the repurchase announcement. News 
coverage has no significant effect on cumulative returns during the first year following 
the repurchase announcement and a negative and significant impact during the second 
and the third year.
Sentiment has a negative and significant impact on cumulative returns starting the 
fourth week following the repurchase announcement. This suggests that a positive 
increase in sentiment is likely to decrease future cumulative returns.
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A high market to book ratio is associated with negative future cumulative returns during 
the first year. During the second and third year, market to book has a positive and 
significant impact on returns. However, it is important to keep in mind that the 
coefficient is very small. This suggests that value stocks have the strongest post 
repurchase stock price drift.
The number of times a company makes a repurchase announcement after the 
initial announcement accounted for in the study has significant effects on cumulative 
returns. Table XII shows that an increase in the number of repurchase announcements 
made during the first year following the initial announcement the study accounts for is 
likely to have positive and significant effect on cumulative returns. However, it has a 
negative and significant impact on returns during the second and the third year.
The higher the debt to assets ratio, the more likely the stock will experience 
positive cumulative returns during the first, second and the third year. The higher a 
company’s percentage of closely held shares, the more negative and significant the 
impact is on cumulative returns following the repurchase announcement. However, the 
higher the repurchase program size, the higher the cumulative returns during the three 
years following the announcement. Finally, companies that hold excess cash and pay 
their shareholders by engaging in repurchase programs are likely to incur negative 
cumulative returns during the second year, but positive returns during the third year.
Prior evidence has shown that under-reaction following a repurchase 
announcement can last up to three years for value stocks (Stephens and Weisbach (1998), 
Ikenberry et al (2000), Jagannathan et al (2003), Chan et al (2004), and Chan et al
(2010)). Table XII shows that ASVI results in positive and significant cumulative returns 
during the first year following the repurchase announcement and that value stocks with 
high ASVI have the most significant and positive cumulative returns. As value stocks are 
dominated by retail investors (Brandt et al (2009)), an increase in ASVI among these 
stocks as a result of an increase in retail investors’ attention leads to buying, which in 
turn results in higher price pressure and higher returns. ASVI, therefore, reduces 
mispricing and accelerates the impounding of information following the repurchase 
announcement among small stocks.
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Table XI
Abnormal Search Volume Index and Cumulative Returns: Univariate Comparisons
This table presents the cumulative returns of stocks with no, low, and high Abnormal Search Volume Index 
(ASVI). Stocks are sorted into terciles by size, market to book ratio, past weekly return, price, illiquidity, 
and analyst coverage. Terciles 1 and 3 refer to the lowest and highest value of each characteristic, 
respectively. Each characteristic-based tercile is further sorted into three ASVI portfolios: no ASVI, low 
ASVI, and high ASVI. Stocks with no ASVI are first identified. The remaining stocks are divided into low 
and high ASVI groups using the median value of ASVI. The cumulative return of each portfolio is then 
computed. The results are reported p=values are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively
ASVI t- Statistics P-value
No Low High No-High No-High No-High
All Stocks -0.0735121 0.0827432 0.0928819 -0.1664*** -16.23 (<.0001)
Panel A: By Size
1 -0.2263958 0.0396213 0.0588854 -0.28*** -12.50 (<.0001)
2 0.0355774 0.1714139 0.1847463 -0.14*** -9.70 (<.0001)
3 -0.0295490 0.0283520 0.0261442 -0.05*** -3.98 (<.0001)
Panel B: By Market to Book
1 -0.1230634 0.1531669 0.1715438 -0.29*** -14.29 (<.0001)
2 -0.0322455 0.0985199 0.0960595 -0.12*** -8.92 (<.0001)
3 -0.0651711 0.000213531 0.0159545 -0.08*** -4.50 (<0001)
Panel C: By Past Weekly Return
1 -0.1187620 0.0596210 0.0718402 -0.190*** -10.13 (<0001)
2 -0.0545088 0.0856760 0.0605215 -0.115*** -6.93 (<0001)
3 -0.0578798 0.1010800 0.1474130 -0.205*** -11.09 (<0001)
Panel D: By Price
1 -0.2767978 0.0879406 0.0954320 -0.372*** -15.85 (<0001)
2 0.0107945 0.0847685 0.1115680 -0.10*** -7.17 (<.0001)
3 0.0292351 0.0757460 0.0705464 -0.0413*** -2.75 (0.0059)
Panel E: By Illiquiciity
1 -0.0203413 0.0825773 0.0907410 -0.11*** -6.64 (<0001)
2 0.0329474 0.1173183 0.1213146 -0.088*** -6.46 (<0001)
3 -0.2261452 0.0677560 0.0844814 -0.31*** -14.16 (<0001)
Panel F: By Analyst Coverage
1 -0.1536937 0.0948041 0.1132155 -0.26*** -14.69 (<0001)
2 -0.0333731 0.0501141 0.0604299 -0.09*** -5.21 (<0001)
3 -0.0103628 0.0996655 0.1011391 -0.11*** -6.81 (<0001)
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Table XII
ASVI and Returns following Repurchase Announcements
This table reports Fama Macbeth (1973) results. The dependent variable is the standardized cumulative 
abnormal returns of stocks that have announced repurchase programs between 2004 and 2008 and for 
which ASVI data is available. Cumulative abnormal returns are reported during the first 4 weeks after the 
repurchase announcement, 5 to 52 weeks, 53 to 104 weeks, and 105 to 156 weeks following the 
announcement. All independent variables are standardized. P-values are reported below the coefficients.
Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 5-52 Week 53-104 Week 105-156
ASVI -0.13253 0.148167 0.029184 0.088496 0.20734* -0.00983 -0.01597
(0.6691) (0.5003) (0.8737) (0.7444) (0.0794) (0.8041) (0.5996)
Logmarketcap*ASVI 0.14789 -0.21859 -0.10258 -0.07752 -0.2397* 0.017114 0.013591
(0.6796) (0.3782) (0.5966) (0.7605) (0.0881) (0.6788) (0.6535)
zlogmarketcap 0.01338 -0.00601 -0.10495 -0.217** -0.15*** -0.13*** -0.10***
(0.9209) (0.9537) (0.2181) (0.0252) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
XRET 0.13441 0.042982 0.302921 0.038319 -0.047** 0.047*** 0.0205**
(0.3301) (0.6904) (0.1058) (0.8076) (0.025) (<.0001) (0.0312)
Adv to sales -0.02032 -0.03247 -0.05976 -0.06916 0.00297 0.0178** 0.0231***
(0.7562) (0.5456) (0.3621) (0.2954) (0.6819) (0.0186) (0.0023)
log analyst 0.02225 0.106605 0.1123* 0.1638** 0.0355*** 0.055*** 0.0278***
(0 .7603) (0.1111) (0 .0885) (0.018) (0 .0005) (<.0001) (0.0012)
volume -0.2066* -0.272** -0.04655 -0.04741 0.0657*** 0.083*** 0.1145***
(0.0864) (0.0213) (0.4861) (0.4341) (0.0007) (<.0001) (<.0001)
sentiment -0.00285 -0.11** -0.03471 -0.096* -0.06*** -0.078*** 0.0323***
(0.9657) (0.0213) (0.4707) (0.0501) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
MB -0.02874 -0.0352 -0.0486* -0.02021 -0.008* 1.62E-02*** -0.011***
(0.5381) (0.2743) (0.0853) (0.532) (0.0908) (0.0004) (0.0079)
announc times -0.02788 0.020884 0.060385 0.070322 0.045*** -0.01855** -0.077***
(0.6644) (0.715) (0.3317) (0.2535) (<.0001) (0.038) (<.0001)
debt to assets -0.02986 0.010295 0.050808 0.069317 0.0184** 0.0583*** 0.0457***
(0.6724) (0.8397) (0.3461) (0.1634) (0.022) (<.0001) (<.0001)
closelyheld 0.126** 0.01822 0.012606 0.016592 -0.079*** -0.131*** -0.165***
(0.0447) (0.721) (0.8016) (0.6993) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)
program size 0.083446 0.043174 0.009931 0.044107 0.0132* 0.02*** 0.084***
(0.2939) (0.3066) (0.7319) (0.3078) (0.0948) (0.0082) (<.0001)
excess cash -0.0276 -0.06531 -0.07101 -0.085* -3.71E-03 -0.012* 0.014*
(0.6175) (0.2211) (0.1952) (0.0759) (0.6447) (0.0996) (0.0907)
news -0.05512 0.006843 -0.00883 0.152708 -0.01665 -0.029** -0.025**
(0.6576) (0.9423) (0.93) (0.1271) (0.2283) (0.0353) (0.0454)
news dummy 0.087611 -0.01335 0.133926 -0.18933 -0.02426 -0.088*** -0.08***
(0.5931) (0.927) (0.3217) (0.2158) (0.2141) (<.0001) (<.0001)
Obs 318 318 318 318 15264 16536 16528
R square 0.0595 0.0662 0.0814 0.0612 0.0239 0.0406 0.0501
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Table XIII investigates the effect of ASVI on cumulative returns controlling for 
different proxies of limits to arbitrage. In Table XIII, we examine the effect of ASVI on 
cumulative returns given different levels of idiosyncratic risk, market to book ratio, and 
past week return. First, we group stocks into quintiles based on investor attention. We 
then select the top and bottom quintiles and sort stocks in each quintile based on the level 
of idiosyncratic risk, market to book ratio, and past week return. We, then, examine the 
effect of ASVI on cumulative returns for these portfolios, controlling for the independent 
variables included in regression in Table XII. Table XIII reports the coefficients of ASVI 
on cumulative returns.
Panels A, B and C show that high ASVI results in positive and significant effect 
on cumulative returns among stocks characterized by high idiosyncratic risk, low market 
to book ratio, and low past week return. The results are significant at the 1% level and 
confirm the findings in Table XII. ASVI accelerates the impounding of the repurchase 
information in stocks that are highly mispriced. These stocks are dominated by retail 
investors and an increase in ASVI results in increased buying, which pushes returns 
higher and reduces mispricing. The findings are in line with the predictions of the 
attention hypothesis of Barber and Odean (2008).
The table shows mixed results on the effect of ASVI on stocks that tend to be less 
mispriced. The effect of high ASVI is negative and significant on stocks with low 
idiosyncratic risk at the 10% level (Panel A), negative though insignicant for high market 
to book stocks (Panel B), and positive and significant at the 1% level among stocks with 
high past week return (Panel C).
Table XIII also reports the effects of ASVI on cumulative returns among stocks 
with low ASVI. It shows that ASVI results in negative returns among all stocks with low 
ASVI. This can be explained by the fact that the stocks in the lowest ASVI quintile have 
negative ASVI. Such stocks suffer from reduced investor attention compared to previous 
weeks. The reduction in investor attention results in less buying, which reduces price 
pressure and results in negative returns. The attention hypothesis postulates that 
inattention results in under-reaction. The results reported in Table XIII regarding stocks 
with low ASVI support this prediction.
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Table XIII
The effect of ASVI on Cumulative Returns during the first year following the
repurchase announcement
The table reports of the effect of ASVI on cumulative returns, during the first year following the repurchase 
announcement and controlling for the variables listed in Table XII. The results are presented by 
subsamples of idiosyncratic risk, market to book ratio and past week return. The dependent variable is the 
standardized cumulative abnormal returns of stocks that have announced repurchase programs between 
2004 and 2008 and for which ASVI data is available. The table gives results across portfolios constructed 
based on abnormal attention (ASVI) and idiosyncratic risk (IR). IR is calculated using the model Ri(t) -  
Rf(t) = a + pl(Rm(t) -  Rf(t)) + p2SMB(t) + p3HML(t) + £i(t). IR is the standard deviation of the error 
term. The results are reported and p-values are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively
ASVI Portfolio
Low High
Panel A: By Idiosyncratic Risk (IR)
Low
-0.50186** -0.32102*
(0.0405) (0.0646)
Medium
-0.36604* 0.15903
(0.0595) (0.2076)
High
-0.66388*** 1.21214***
(0.0007) (<.0001)
Panel B: By Market to Book
Low
-0.76695*** 0.93605***
(<.0001) (<.0001)
Medium
-0.00561 -0.07797
(0.9777) (0.6275)
High
-0.06596 -0.00311
( 0.7771) (0.9828 )
Panel C: By Past Week Return
Low
-0.37668* 1.16164***
(0.0634) (<.0001)
Medium
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-0.04995 -0.17068
(0.7782) (0.1863)
High
-0.72771*** 0.74410***
(0.0006) (<.0001)
SUMMARY
In this paper, we set out to study the effect of investor attention on the stock price 
repurchases drift. We find that investor attention, measured by Google’s ASVI, results in 
positive cumulative returns one year after the repurchase announcement. The results are 
driven by small stocks, stocks with high idiosyncratic risk, stocks with low market to 
book ratio, and stocks with low past return. Prior research has shown that for such 
stocks, the repurchase drift lasts for three years due to limits to arbitrage. As these stocks 
are dominated by retail investors, an increase in retail investors’ attention as measured by 
ASVI results in increased buying, which pushes prices and cumulative returns higher. A 
decrease in ASVI is caused by investors’ inattention, which causes negative cumulative 
returns. We conclude that an increase in ASVI accelerates the impounding of the 
repurchase announcement into the prices of stocks that tend to be mispriced. The findings 
in this paper provide further support to the attention hypothesis.
64
REFERENCES
Andriosopoulos, D., & Hoque, H. (2013). The determinants of share repurchases in 
Europe. International Review of Financial Analysis, 27, 65-76.
Au, A. S., Doukas, J. A., & Onayev, Z. (2009). Daily short interest, idiosyncratic risk, 
and stock returns. Journal of Financial Markets, 12(2), 290-316.
Bagwell, L. S., & Shoven, J. B. (1988). Share repurchases and acquisitions: An analysis 
of which firms participate. In Corporate takeovers: Causes and consequences (pp. 191- 
220). University of Chicago Press.
Baker, M., & Wurgler, J. (2007). Investor sentiment in the stock market. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 21, 129-151.
Banyi, M. L., Dyl, E. A., & Kahle, K. M. (2008). Errors in estimating share repurchases. 
Journal of Corporate Finance, 14(4), 460-474.
Barber, B. M., & Odean, T. (2008). All that glitters: The effect of attention and news on 
the buying behavior of individual and institutional investors. Review of Financial 
Studies, 21(2), 785-818.
Barber, B. M., & Odean, T. (2000). Trading is hazardous to your wealth: The common 
stock investment performance of individual investors. The journal of Finance, 55(2), 773- 
806.
Barberis, N., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1998). A model of investor sentiment. Journal of 
financial economics, 49(3), 307-343.
Bartram, S. M., Brown, P. R., How, J. C., & Verhoeven, P. (2012). Agency conflicts and 
corporate payout policies: a global study. Available at SSRN 1068281.
Bonaime, A. A., & Ryngaert, M. D. (2013). Insider trading and share repurchases: Do 
insiders and firms trade in the same direction?. Journal of Corporate Finance, 22, 35-53.
Brandt, M. W., Brav, A., Graham, J. R., & Kumar, A. (2009). The idiosyncratic volatility 
puzzle: Time trend or speculative episodes?. Review of Financial Studies, hhp087.
Brown, G. W., & Cliff, M. T. (2004). Investor sentiment and the near-term stock market. 
Journal of Empirical Finance, 11(1), 1-27.
Chan, K., Ikenberry, D., & Lee, I. (2004). Economic sources of gain in stock repurchases. 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 39(03), 461-479.
Chan, K., Ikenberry, D. L., & Lee, I. (2007). Do managers time the market? Evidence 
from open-market share repurchases. Journal of Banking & Finance, 31(9), 2673-2694.
65
Chan, K., Ikenberry, D. L., Lee, I., & Wang, Y. (2010). Share repurchases as a potential 
tool to mislead investors. Journal of Corporate Finance, 16(2), 137-158.
Chemmanur, T. J., Cheng, Y., & Zhang, T. (2010). Why do firms undertake accelerated 
share repurchase programs?. Available at SSRN 1107217
Chemmanur, T. (2009). Advertising, attention, and stock returns (Doctoral dissertation, 
School of Business Administration, Fordham University).
Chen, J., Hong, H., & Stein, J. C. (2002). Breadth of ownership and stock returns. Journal 
of financial Economics, 66(2), 171-205.
Chordia, T., Huh, S. W., & Subrahmanyam, A. (2007). The cross-section of expected 
trading activity. Review of Financial Studies, 20(3), 709-740.
Cohen, L., & Frazzini, A. (2008). Economic links and predictable returns. The Journal of 
Finance, 63(4), 1977-2011.
Da, Z., Engelberg, J., & Gao, P. (2011). In search of attention. The Journal of Finance, 
66(5), 1461-1499.
Daniel, K., Hirshleifer, D., & Subrahmanyam, A. (1998). Investor psychology and 
security market under-and overreactions, the Journal of Finance, 53(6), 1839-1885.
DellaVigna, S., & Pollet, J. M. (2007). Demographics and industry returns. The 
American Economic Review, 1667-1702.
DellaVigna, S., & Pollet, J. M. (2009). Investor inattention and Friday earnings 
announcements. The Journal of Finance, 64(2), 709-749.
Ding, R., & Hou, W. (2014). Retail investor attention and stock liquidity. Available at 
SSRN 1786762.
Dittmar, A. K. (2000). Why Do Firms Repurchase Stock. The Journal of Business, 73(3), 
331-355.
Doukas, J., Kim, C., & Pantzalis, C. (2010). Arbitrage risk and stock mispricing. Journal 
of Financial and Quantitative Analysis.
Doukas, J. A., Kim, C. F., & Pantzalis, C. (2005). The two faces of analyst coverage. 
Financial Management, 34(2), 99-125.
Easterbrook, F. H. (1984). Two agency-cost explanations of dividends. The American 
Economic Review, 650-659.
66
Engelberg, J., Sasseville, C., & Williams, J. (2012). Market madness? The case of mad 
money. Management Science, 58(2), 351-364.
Fama, E. F. (1970). Efficient capital markets: A review of theory and empirical work.
The journal of Finance, 25(2), 383-417.
Fama, E. F., & MacBeth, J. D. (1973). Risk, return, and equilibrium: Empirical tests. The 
Journal of Political Economy, 607-636.
Fu, F. (2009). Idiosyncratic risk and the cross-section of expected stock returns. Journal 
of Financial Economics, 91(1), 24-37.
Gervais, S., Kaniel, R., & Mingelgrin, D. H. (2001). The high-volume return premium. 
The Journal of Finance, 56(3), 877-919.
Gromb, D., & Vayanos, D. (2002). Equilibrium and welfare in markets with financially 
constrained arbitrageurs. Journal of financial Economics, 66(2), 361-407.
Grullon, G., & Michaely, R. (2002). Dividends, share repurchases, and the substitution 
hypothesis. The Journal of Finance, 57(4), 1649-1684.
Grullon, G., & Michaely, R. (2004). The information content o f  share repurchase 
programs. The Journal of Finance, 59(2), 651-680.
Grullon, G., Kanatas, G., & Weston, J. P. (2004). Advertising, breadth of ownership, and 
liquidity. Review of Financial Studies, 17(2), 439-461.
Hirshleifer, D., & Hong Teoh, S. (2003). Herd behaviour and cascading in capital 
markets: A review and synthesis. European Financial Management, 9(1), 25-66.
Hirshleifer, D., Hou, K., Teoh, S. H., & Zhang, Y. (2004). Do investors overvalue firms 
with bloated balance sheets?. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 38,297-331.
Hirshleifer, D., Lim, S. S., & Teoh, S. H. (2009). Driven to distraction: Extraneous events 
and underreaction to earnings news. The Journal of Finance, 64(5), 2289-2325.
Hong, H., & Stein, J. C. (1999). A unified theory of underreaction, momentum trading, 
and overreaction in asset markets. The Journal of Finance, 54(6), 2143-2184.
Hou, K., & Moskowitz, T. J. (2005). Market frictions, price delay, and the cross-section 
of expected returns. Review of Financial Studies, 18(3), 981-1020.
Hou, K., Xiong, W., & Peng, L. (2008). A tale of two anomalies: The implications of 
investor attention for price and earnings momentum. Available at SSRN 976394.
67
Hovakimian, A., Opler, T., & Titman, S. (2001). The debt-equity choice. Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative analysis, 36(01), 1-24.
Huberman, G., & Regev, T. (2001). Contagious speculation and a cure for cancer: A 
nonevent that made stock prices soar. The Journal of Finance, 56(1), 387-396.
Ikenberry, D. L., Rankine, G., & Stice, E. K. (1996). What do stock splits really signal?. 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative analysis, 31(3).
Ikenberry, D., Lakonishok, J., & Vermaelen, T. (1995). Market underreaction to open 
market share repurchases. Journal of financial economics, 39(2), 181-208.
Ikenberry, D., Lakonishok, J., & Vermaelen, T. (2000). Stock repurchases in Canada: 
Performance and strategic trading. The Journal of Finance, 55(5), 2373-2397.
Ikenberry, D., Lakonishok, J., & Vermaelen, T. (2000). Stock repurchases in Canada: 
Performance and strategic trading. The Journal of Finance, 55(5), 2373-2397.
Jagannathan, M., & Stephens, C. (2003). Motives for multiple open-market repurchase 
programs. Financial Management, 71-91.
Jensen, M. C. (1986). Agency cost o f  free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. 
Corporate Finance, and Takeovers. American Economic Review, 76(2).
Kahneman, D. (1973). Attention and effort (p. 246). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Kaniel, R., Saar, G., & Titman, S. (2008). Individual investor trading and stock returns. 
The Journal of Finance, 63(1), 273-310.
Karlsson, N., Seppi, D. J., & Loewenstein, G. (2005). The'ostrich effect': Selective 
attention to information about investments. Available at SSRN 772125.
Lasfer, M. A. (2000). The market valuation of share repurchases in Europe. City 
University Business School.
Lie, E., & Lie, H. J. (1999). The role o f personal taxes in corporate decisions: An 
empirical analysis of share repurchases and dividends. Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis, 34(04), 533-552.
Lou, D. (2014). Attracting Investor Attention through Advertising. Review of Financial 
Studies, 27(6), 1797-1829.
Masulis, R. W. (1980). Stock repurchase by tender offer: An analysis of the causes of 
common stock price changes. The Journal of Finance, 35(2), 305-319.
68
McNally, W. J. (1999). Open Market Stock Repurchase Signaling. Financial 
Management, 28(2), 55-67
Merton, R. C. (1987). A simple model of capital market equilibrium with incomplete 
information. The journal of finance, 42(3), 483-510.
Michaely, R., Thaler, R. H., & Womack, K. L. (1995). Price reactions to dividend 
initiations and omissions: Overreaction or drift?. The Journal of Finance, 50(2), 573-608.
Michel, A., Oded, J., & Shaked, I. (2010). Not all buybacks are created equal: The case 
of accelerated stock repurchases. Financial Analysts Journal, 66(6), 55-72.
Mitchell, J. D., & Dharmawan, G. V. (2007). Incentives for on-market buy-backs: 
Evidence from a transparent buy-back regime. Journal of Corporate Finance, 13(1), 146- 
169.
Odean, T. (1998). Are investors reluctant to realize their losses?. The Journal of finance, 
53(5), 1775-1798.
Oded, J. (2005). Why do firms announce open-market repurchase programs?. Review of 
Financial Studies, 18(1), 271-300.
Peng, L., & Xiong, W. (2006). Investor attention, overconfidence and category learning. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 80(3), 563-602.
Peng, L. (2005). Learning with information capacity constraints. Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis, 40(02), 307-329.
Peyer, U., & Vermaelen, T. (2009). The nature and persistence of buyback anomalies. 
Review of Financial Studies, 22(4), 1693-1745.
Pontiff, J. (2006). Costly arbitrage and the myth of idiosyncratic risk. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 42(1), 35-52.
Rau, P. R., & Vermaelen, T. (2002). Regulation, Taxes, and Share Repurchases in the 
United Kingdom. The Journal of Business, 75(2), 245-282.
Seasholes, M. S., & Wu, G. (2007). Predictable behavior, profits, and attention. Journal 
of Empirical Finance, 14(5), 590-610.
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997). A survey of corporate governance. The journal of 
finance, 52(2), 737-783.
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997). The limits of arbitrage. The Journal o f Finance, 
52(1), 35-55.
69
Stephens, C. P., & Weisbach, M. S. (1998). Actual share reacquisitions in open-market 
repurchase programs. The Journal of Finance, 53(1), 313-333.
Tetlock, P. C. (2010). Does public financial news resolve asymmetric information?. 
Review of Financial Studies, 23(9), 3520-3557.
Vermaelen, T. (1981). Common stock repurchases and market signalling: An empirical 
study. Journal of financial economics, 9(2), 139-183.
Wurgler, J., & Zhuravskaya, E. (2002). Does Arbitrage Flatten Demand Curves for 
Stocks?*. The Journal of Business, 75(4), 583-608.
Yuan, Y. (2008). Attention and trading. Unpublished Working Paper. University of 
Pennsylvania.
Zhang, H. (2005). Share price performance following actual share repurchases. Journal of 
Banking & Finance, 29(7), 1887-1901.
70
CONCLUSION
This thesis sought to investigate the impact of investor attention, as measured by 
SVI, on the expected returns of EREITs and the open market repurchases post 
announcement returns. Essay 1 shows that investor attention has a significant impact on 
EREITs returns. More specifically, EREITs that attract high investor attention, as 
measured by SVI, generate higher returns than EREITs with no investor attention. The 
univariate analysis shows that average returns are especially higher for the EREITs that 
are small, with high book to market ratio, low past month return, low price, and are 
highly illiquid. Controlling for different risk factors, we find that increased investor 
attention results in higher average returns among stocks that are small and with high book 
to market ratio. We also report that the SVI effect is not spurious. The positive and 
significant effect of SVI on stocks is not driven by impediments to trade. Rather, the SVI 
effect is due to improvement in investor recognition. SVI improves investor recognition 
among stocks that suffer from poor information dissemination and high information 
incompleteness, which results in high returns. This lends support to the Attention 
hypothesis of Barber and Odean (2008) and Merton’s (1987) investor recognition 
hypothesis.
Essay 2 shows that abnormal investor attention, as measured by ASVI, results in 
positive and significant cumulative returns in the stocks of firms that have made 
repurchase announcements. The univariate analysis shows that ASVI has the largest and 
most significant impact on the stocks that are small, with low market to book ratio, are 
low priced, are more illiquid and are with low analyst coverage. The multivariate analysis 
shows that ASVI results in positive and significant returns during the first year following 
the repurchase announcement. The analysis also shows that the results are driven by 
small stocks. Further analysis indicates that high ASVI results in positive and significant 
effect on cumulative returns during the first year following the announcement among 
stocks with high idiosyncratic risk, low market to book ratio, and low past return. Prior 
studies have documented that such stocks under-react to the repurchase announcement 
for up to three years due to limits to arbitrage. We conclude that abnormal retail investor 
attention, as measured by Google’s ASVI, increases buying among stocks that suffer
71
from limits to arbitrage. ASVI, therefore, reduces mispricing and results in the 
impounding of the repurchase announcement information into stock prices. This is in 
line with the predictions of the investor attention hypothesis.
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